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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The private language problem, as such, is a twentieth century 
phenomenon. This "problem" is in fact a network of interconnected 
problems and questions which, if traced out, eventually lead to many 
different areas of philosophical concern and bring in many of the 
perennial philosophical questions. The center of concern is the 
question, which gives this network its name, of whether a private 
language is possi.blew 13:y 'private langl,lage' is meant, neither a 
language which only one or a few people happen to known, nor a code 
devised to keep connnunications private to a particular group, but a 
language which, in principle, only its speaker can understand. In 
other words, the central problem is whether there can be, or perhaps 
in fact are, words or signs with meanings that can, in principle, be 
known only by their usero The relatively recent awareness of and 
interest in this problem has been generated primarily by portions of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigationso1 
However, as Saunders and Henze have put it, 11 the private language 
problem is at once as old as philosophy and as new as televisiono112 
The sense in which this problem is as old as philosophy is that many 
philosophical opinions throughout the history of philosophy can be seen 
to entail at least the possibility, and often the existence of private 
languages, in areas of our connnon language (the areas in question being 
those dealing with sensations, emotions, and experiences), although the 
1 
2 
form,ulators of such opinions may not have been .aware of this aspect of 
their views (and certainly didn't discuss this aspect .directly). It has 
been suggested, for example, that the works of Protagoras, Hobbes, 
Descartes, and Locke all entail the possibility or actual existence of 
. 1 3 private. anguageso 
In order to understand the relation between this historical aspect 
of the problem and its emergence in modern and contemporary philosophi-
cal debate a few words about the nature of Wittgenstein's Investiga-
tion~ and his approach to philosophy are necessary. As is well known, 
in the Inyestigations Wittgenstein attacked a number of traditionally 
held philosophical beliefs including many which he had himself held 
earlier in his career (such as the belief in "essences"), and he did 
this in a new sort of way. He did not offer counter arguments to 
specific philosophical theories, and then offer and defend theories of 
his own to replace them, but rather offered considerations about the 
general nature and functioning of language intended to show that many 
philosophical problems are at bottom confusions resulting from linguistic 
misconceptions, misunderstandings about how language functionso Part 
of the problem, however, was that the confusions Wittgenstein exposed 
were confusions only implicit in the traditional philosophical theories 
involved. 'I'hat is, part of his work must be seen as bringing out 
general theories of the functioning of language which were implicit 
and quite unrecognized, or automatically presupposed as unexceptionable, 
by much traditional philqsophy. Then he brought these exposed theories 
of language into question. This two part approach to philosophical 
investigation is~that often currently referred to as diagnosis and 
elucidation of linguistic confusions, and forms the basis of the 
"school" of philosophy which employs this method, sometimes referred to 
as "linguistic analysis" or "ordinary language philosophy11 o 
But Wittgenstein himself, in the Investigations, very seldom 
specifically mentioned other philosophers· and took no special pai11s to 
relate the views he attacked (which were usually presented by means of 
an imaginary interlocutor) to those of well known and traditionally 
recognized figures in the history of philosophy or to those of his 
contemporarieso In a very few cases, specific, direct quotations or 
paraphrases frmn other philosophers are cited as such by Wittgenstein, 
and in a few others, statements of Wittgenstein's interlocutor are 
easily recognizable as the views of some particular philosopher, 4 but 
for the most part the views criticised in the Investigations are comm 
pounded out of many sources and represent basic elements common to 
many other philosophies, and in these cases the sometimes quite 
difficult job of recognizing this connection is left to the readero 
For this reason, a great deal of the "diagnostic" aspect of Wittgen- · 
stein's approach, (that is, the job of showing that some particular 
philosopher's work presupposes, implies, or entails the general views 
criticised by Wittgenstein) ha~ been bequeathed to his successorso 
It remains quite possible, however, to discuss the views pre-
sented by Wittgenstein's interlocutor on their own, so to speak, with-
out demonstrating some specific connection between them and the views 
of a particular philosopher (or philosophers), even when such a connec-
tion is not obvious., Two ways in which such a discussion is useful 
are, first, the case in which someone wished to argue that Wittgenstein 
did not successfully defeat the views expressed by his interlocutor and 
so, whether or not these views are entailed or presupposed by those of 
3 
4 
anyone else, no successful criticism could result; and second, the case 
in which someone might attempt to criticise another's view by first 
getting him to agree independently that, for example, a private language 
is impossible, and then proceeding to demonstrate that his view entails 
the possibility of a private language and so must be rejectedo Of 
course there is also the fact that the basic questions of the private 
language problem are quite fascinating in their own right, but the full 
significance of the problem can only be appreciated when the connection 
between it and traditional philosophy is recognizedo 
The fact remains, however, that there are these two distinguishable 
aspects of the private language problem: the diagnosis of traditional 
philosophical works as involving this problem, and the elucidation of 
the problem itself, ioeo, independent discussion of whether any of our 
words have private meanings or whether it would be possible to invent 
such wordso The focus of this thesis is on the latter aspect of the 
problemo 
There is yet another preliminary matter which must be discussed 
before the purposes of this paper can be clearly set oute Although 
Wittgenstein raised the question of private language and, as is 
generally recognized, opposed the view that any words in our common 
language have private meanings, there is considerable confusion as to 
what he offered beyond this, the Philosophical Investigations being 
notoriously cryptic and obscure, and Wittgenstein's approach to 
philosophy being quite novelo 
There are several possible positions with respect to the private 
language problem, all of which have been occupied at various times 
by various philosopherso In addition to (1) the traditional view that 
such a language is not only possible, but that areas of our connnon 
language are of this nature, there is (2) the view that although our 
connnon language is indeed public, still it is possible that one should 
invent a private language, and (3) the view that a private language 
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is·. not possible.. View (3) may take various forms according to the 
reasons adduced for the alleged impossibility, sometimes pitting two 
opponents of private language against each other as to why such a 
language is impossible .. Disagreement also may erupt between holders of 
views (2) and (3) as to why no areas of our connnon language are private. 
In any case, part of the private language problem is the question 
of names and naming,.. The possibility of a private language hinges 
upon the notion of naming: it involves the notion of directly associat-
ing names with logically private data. One who claims (or whose 
philosophy entails the view) that there are words in our language the 
meanings of which can be known only by the speaker, sensation and emo-
tion words usually being the ones in question, will be required to 
explain how such words acquire their private meanings, such an explan-
ation usually taking the form of a description of a sort of private 
act of naming (conferring a name on a private object or datum)o One 
who denies that any of the words of our language have private meanings 
may do so on the grounds that this notion of private acts of naming is 
defective, and will need to indicate how the words in question do 
function .. One who claims the impossibility of a private language will 
likewise be required to connnent on the matter of names and naming. In 
the body of literature which has recently built up around these 
questions, not only have all of the various possible views of the 
matter been defended, but several different views have been defended 
in the name of Wittgenstein, as interpretations of his position in the 
Philosophical Investigationso 
The purpose of this thesis is multipleo What is offered here is, 
first, a series of what I hope are relatively clear examples of the 
possible positions with respect to the private language problem, show-
ing the reasons adduced for them and the objections to themo The views 
examined will also serve as examples of various views of names .,and. 
namingo As mentioned earlier, the focus of the paper is on the recent 
debate of the problem, which has been relatively independent of ques-
tions of an historical natureo Thus, the traditional view (that parts 
of our language are private) is only characterized to provide back-
ground for the development of the views opposing it in various wayso 
At the same time, I have tried to make it clear that this traditional 
view must be rejectedo Since it does seem that the full significance 
of the problem can only be appreciated by seeing its connection with 
the actual history of philosophy, an appendix note has been attached 
to this thesis providing an example of the diagnosis of a traditional 
view needed to establish this connectiono 
Following this initial characterization of the traditional view 
referred to above as view (1), representatives of positions (2) and 
(3) appear .. View (3), or rather, one form of view (3), that a private 
language is impossible, appears first, exemplified by the work of 
George Pitcher .. This is followed by the work of Alan Donagan as a 
representative of view (2), that a private language is possible, though 
no part of our connnon language is of this nature .. This order is used 
because Donagan's view includes criticism of Pitcher 1 so 
The second purpose of this thesis concerns the confusion over~the 
6 
interpretation of Wittgenstein's position in the Investigationso, The 
two views presented, those of Pitcher and Donagan, serve not only as 
examples of different possible positions, but each is also presented 
by its author as Wittgenstein's view, and so the two exemplify the 
interpretation problem, as wello 
The third purpose of this thesis is to show that Pitcher's and 
Donagan's views are themselves as unacceptable as the traditional view 
and that neither in fact represents a correct understanding of the 
Investigations. 
7 
Finally, I hope to indicate what the main point of a correct under-
standing of the Investigations is, and that this is in fact, the correct 
solution to the private language problemo 
FOOTNOTES 
1LndW'igWittg~n:ste;in,. Philosophical Investigations, (New York, 
1958), In, subsequent textual references, this work will be referred to 
merely as the Investigations, as has.become customary. 
2 .. 
John Turk Saunders and Donald Fe Henze, The Private Language 
P;:oblem, (New York, 1967), P• 4. 
3Ibido, po 1. Hobbes' view is briefly examined in Appendix. 
4cf, e.g., Wittgenstein, p~ 109: ''William James, in order to 
show that thought is possible without speech•••" 
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CHAPTER II. 
THE TRADITIONAL VIEW 
What is here referred to as the traditional view of language and 
the private language problem, seems to come to one quite naturally and 
easily-.. In fact, the traditional view of language may seem so plausi-
ble, so basic a fact, as not even to need any discussion. This seems 
to be precisely why the traditional view treated of in this section is, 
in a sense, an artificial creationo But it is artificial only in the 
sense that it can be seen to underlie the work of many philosophers, 
rather than to come in for explicit discussion by them. Thus, the tra-
ditional view of langqage is more a diagnosis ·of the,source of many 
traditional philosophical problems than an ostensible component of 
traditional philosophy. However, its value as a diagnosis is not here 
in question, only its plausibility is.1 
The traditional view may come about in answer to a question like 
"How does language function?'', or 11What is the essence of language ?11 0 
There seems to be an obvious and rather simple answer. Language con-
sists of words, which are signs, names, for thihgso By assigning words 
to refer to things, to label them, so to speak, we are able to connnuni-
cate about the world. What a word means is the thing for which it is a 
sign; that is, the meaning of a word is its referento And thus, learn-
ing language consists in learning which words refer to which things. 
Here we seem to have the basic constituents of language, name-labels, 
and the basic operation involved in learning language, the attaching of 
9 
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the appropriate labels to the appropriate things. 
As Wittgenstein has pointed out, St. Augustine expre5-ses a view 
quite like this in his Confessions.2 In the passage quoted l;Jy Wittgen-
stein, Augustine speaks of language as a series of names (nouns like 
the names for pieces of furniture, and people's names) learned.indi-
vidually and then strung together in sentences. Notably, "Augustine 
does not speak of there being any difference between kinds of word113 , 
but seems to think of whatever other kinds there might be as "some-
thing that will take care of itself114, as not central to the functioning 
of language, as not part of the "essence" of language. This notion of 
the functioning of language as a fairly unified and simple process con-
sisting of the association of names with objects (which are the mean-
ings of the words) is characteristic of the:tradit.ional view. 
Of course only a little reflection will remind someone .that::not 
all of the words in our language are nouns like 'chair' and 'Socrates'. 
But again, whatever other sorts there are seem insignificant or seem 
to differ ,only in some minor way. There are, for example, such words 
as 'of', 1to', 'and', etc., which may first come to mind. These are 
the sort that may seem rather insignificant, subsidiary. This feeling 
is expressed in Mill's distinguishing as, "only parts of/ names", the 
following words (and those similar): 1of', 'to', 'truly', 'me', 'him', 
5 
'John's', 'large', and 'heavy'. All the important words it seems, 
are riames, words which labe(Lthings, and there are, in addition, such 
auxilliaries as these prepositions, pronouns, and adjectives. 
One may also notice, upon further reflection, that there are 
different sorts of things or objects which we use words to label, but 
here the difference seems only minor. There are for example emotions, 
11 
like love and hate, and sensations, like pain and tickling. All this 
seems to come to, however, is that our language has the richnesEi of 
labelling both physical and non-physical "objects"• This richness is 
often noted in grammar books bydefining a noun as "the riame of a per-
son, place, thing, or mental state"• Similarly, Aristotle's categories 
might be interpreted as a classification of the different kinds of 
things which can bear names (Mill has taken them this way). 6 At any 
rate, there seems to be no more than a minor note required here: the 
essence of language is naming; names label pieces of furniture, people, 
and other things, so that we may talk about them (and there are also 
such auxillaries as prepositions, conjunctions, etc.). 
As mentioned earlier, on this view learning language consists in 
properly associating names with the things for which they stand. A 
child learns what 'dog' means, for example, by having all the various 
neighborhood dogs pointed out to him, along with the instruction 
"There's a doggiell, or "See the dog"., Or, if he wants to know what 
'rock' means, he has various rocks pointed out to him, and so on with 
'bird', 'milk', .'sandbox', and others., 
Private Language 
But when we consider that area of our language which deals with 
sensations, emotions, perceptions, and experiences there seems to be 
this difference~ here the referents for words aren't public, aren't 
open to everyone's view as were those of 'dog' and 'sandbox' .. The 
things to which words like 'pain', 'love', and 'red' refer, appear to 
be items of the individual speaker's consciousness 9 items which he 
alone experiences, and thus, which he alone has "access" to, 
12 
rather than items of our corinnon, public world, like dogs anci s~nµboxeso 
When Smith says, for example, "This chair is comfortable", we can all 
look and see the chair, o:r when he says "That music is beautiful" we 
can all listen and hear the music, but when he says 111'.his pain is 
ter:t;"ible", we cannot all feel Smith's pain. His pain is his alone; it 
is an item private to his consciousness. No one can experience Smith's 
pain except Smith. No one can experience anyone's sensations except 
his own. 
This being the case, philosophical reflection immediately gives·.tise 
to the question, "How do I know that Smith means the same thing by the 
word 'pain' that I do?"• Perhaps the sensation he calls 'pain' is what 
I would have called 1 tickle 1 o Similarly, in the case of color words 
it seems, quite possible that we should discover that what Smith calls 
'red' the rest of us would have called 'green', were we able to see 
through Smith's eyes. It might even be that one half of mankind, say, 
the women, have a different sensation of red than the other half.7 
Since no one may feel another's sensations Cir see through another's 
eyes, all these, and many more, possibilities seem live .. What each 
person means by the word 'pain' when he says 11 1 am in pain", he and he 
alone knows for he and he alone has access to, can feel, the sensation 
which is the referent for that wordo 
For precisely the same reason, none of the above speculations can 
be verified. The thesis that what Smith calls 'red' I would have 
called 'green', or that what Smith means by 'pain' is not the same as 
what I mean by 'pain', can be neither confirmed nor disconfirmedo But 
this seems to leave one thing certain: the language of color percep-
tions and sensations (and similarly, that of emotions and experiences) 
13 
is indeed a p:i;:ivate area of our language; for although each individual 
knows tlrhat he means by 'pain', he alone does. 
'.rhis fact seems to emerge as a profound philosophical discovery, 
but one which gives rise to two further questions. If the language 
· of sensations is thus private, each person knowing only what he himself 
calls 'pain', then, first, how is the word 'pain' taught and learned?, 
and second, how is it that we seem to communicate with words like 
'pain'? 
~rivate, Ostensive Definition 
'l'he traditional view's answers to these questions are intimately 
connected. As we have seen, words of our publi~ common language are 
learned by means of ostensive definitions. One learns what things are 
called 'dogs' and what things are called 'sandboxes' by having such 
things pginted out to hime It seems then that what must be involved 
in learning the meanings of sensation words like 'pain' is a sort of 
private ostensive definition. A. Jo Ayer gives this description of the 
process: 
As it is, a child is not taught to describe his 
feelings in the way he is taught to describe the 
objects in his nursery. His mother cannot point 
to. his pain in the way that she can point to his 
cup and spoon. But she knows that he has a pain 
because he cries and because she sees that some-
thing has happened to him.which is likely to 
cause him pain; and knowing that he is in pain 
she is able to teach him what to call ito If 
there were no external signs of his sensations 
s~e would have no means of detecting when he 
had them, and therefore could not teach him how 
to describe them.a 
Thus, the meaning of the word 'pain', can be taught only by making use 
of certain special occassionso When the teacher observes that the child 
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has undergone something which would cause pain in the teacher (say, a 
scraped knee) and exhibits the same external manifestations as might 
the teacher when in pain (say, crying) then the teacher infers that the 
child also has the appropriate sensation, that which is called 'pain', 
and so can inform the child that he is to call that sensation 1 pain 1 e 
Of course, this instruction will most likely take place in the context 
of comforting the child, that is, by saying 11 1 know it hurts'', or 
something similar, but it is the process described above which is 
involved in the child's learning what the word 'pain' meanso 
What the child must do in this situation is notice the sensation 
he is feeling during this time and associate with it the name 'pain', 
and thus, after sufficient repetitions of this experience, he will 
remember that t:his sensation is called 'pain', and will be able to 
say, on his own, 11 1 am in pain", when it recurs. 
The Analogy Argument 
In the foregoing explanation of how sensation words are taught 
and learned we find also the traditional answer to the second of the 
questions raised earlier, that of how we seem to communicate with words 
like 'pain'o We simply do not doubt, ordinarily, that others mean the 
same sensation by the word 'pain' that we do, since all the external, 
or observable, signs are the same when they use the word as when we do, 
just as the teacher inferred that the child had the appropriate sensa-
tion, in the above example, when he exhibited the appropriate behavior 
in the appropriate circumstances .. 
Jo So Mills' statement may be taken as representative of this 
element of the traditional view: 9 
I conclude that other human beings have feelings 
like me, because, first, they have bodies like 
me, which I know, in my own case, to be the ante-
cedent condition of feelings; and because secondly, 
they exhibit the acts, and other outward signs, 
which in my own case I know by experience to be 
caused by feelingso I am conscious in myself of 
a series of facts connected by a uniform sequence 
of which the beginning is modification of my body, 
the middle is feelings, the erid is outward demeanor. 
In the case of other human beings I have the evi-
dence of my senses for the first and last links of 
the series, but not for the intermediate linkoooby 
supposing the link to be of the same nature as in 
the case of which I have experience,ooeI bring 
other human beings under the same generalizations 
which I know by experience to be the true theory 
of my own existenceo10 
There seems to be this asynnnetry then in the use of sensation 
words: I know, in my own case, what I call Vpainv, what sensation I 
mean by that word, but when someone else says 11 I am in pain11 , or 
when I say of someone else that he is in pain, what is involved is an 
inference made on the basis of an analogical argument similar to 
Mill's., Thus, first person sensation statements seem to express true 
knowledge, whereas, third person sensation statements express only 
inferences, which could in any given case be incorrecto 
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In summary, the traditional view of names, naming, and the private 
language problem has the following elements. The primary words in our 
language, the substantives, are names which signify objectso The 
meanings of such words are the things which they name, their referents. 
There are, however, both public objects, like chairs, dogs, and sand-
boxes, which are open to everyone's view9 and private objects, like 
pains, which are not open to everyonevs view, but which can be directly 
observed or experienced only by the person who has them, each person 
experiences only his own sensationsi, no one may have another 9 so For 
this reason there must be two sorts of learning techniques, public 
16 
ostensive definitions, by which words referring to publ:i,c 1 it.emf? Gan be. 
learned,and private ostensive definitions which each perso~ mijst e~ploy 
for himself in order to as.sociate a word with the sensation it na-qies. 
And finally, at the base_ of this latter method of tea.ch:j.ng, .the::met:hod 
employed in those areas of our language which deal with sensations, 
emotions, and other experiences, is an analoa;:fdal argument, which.also 
is the basis on which we seem to achieve communication in these areas 
of our language. As we shall see in the next section, this view leads 
to puzzling, and unacceptable, consequences. 
Puzzles Generated by the Traditional View 
On the traditional view, although an analogical argument similar 
to Mills• may seem to describe what must be the basis of the private 
areas af:our language, the fact remains that these areas are, strictly 
speaking, private. If, when Smith says 111 am in pain", 'pain' is the 
name of an item of his consciousness, and if no one else may experi-
ence that item, have his pain, then he, and only he, can at any given 
time know with certainty whether or not he has it, whether he ·.is in 
fact in paino The rest of us may infer that he is in pain, since he is 
similarly constituted, but the most we can have, as the result of such 
an inference, is a probability that he is in paino Thus, on the tra-
ditional view, each person is i11, the position of being the only one who 
can know with certainty that he".-.is in pain, and of not being able to 
know with certainty that anyone else is in pain. 
What similarly follows from the traditional view is that the mean-
ings of such words as 1 pain 1 can be, strictly speaking, neither taught 
lllOrlearned. For when a situation appropriate for the teaching and 
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learning of sensation words appears, as in the example frqmAy'1,r_above, 
the teacher actually only believes that the learner has t;he_apprQpriate 
sensation; the most the teacher would logically be allowed to say is 
that it is probable that the learner has the appropriate sensation, and 
the most the lear.ner should be allowed to say is that it is probable 
that he has what the teacher calls 'pain'o 
After such an analysis as :this, the philosopher may appear to be in: 
the classical position of possessing an insight into an ultimate truth 
that is not possessed by the ordinary mano He seems to have discovered 
that ultimately, strictly speaking, the facts are that one has direct 
knowledge of sensations, emotions, and experiences only in his own 
case, and that all other instances (ioe., cases of third person sensa-
tion statements) are cases of inference. Although the ordinary man may 
continue,to make statements like "He is in pain", the philosopher 
realizes that this·is a loose or imprecise way of speaking, it being 
the case that the only precisely accurate statement which can be made in 
such cases is "It is very highly probable that he is in pain"• 
The analogical argument, again, is seen '.as the logical basis for 
such third person statements, and might be used as the philosopher':s 
justification for not insisting on the revision of our ordinary way of 
speaking, since this argument seems to make it so very highly probable 
that we all experience the same sensations in similar circumstanceso 
But the analogical argument is, recall, the inference that other indi-
viduals, constituted similarly to me, and affected similarly,exte])"-
nally, experience a sensation which is the same as the one I experience 
under the same.stimulation, since their overt behavior is similaro 
That is, in my own case, touching a hot stove produces in me the sensa-
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tion of pain, to which I react by screaming, holding my hand, etco 
Other people; I have observed, react similarly when they touch a hot 
stove and so, since their physical constitution is similar to mine, 
they must experience the same sensation of pain as the cause of their 
reaction. 
But how good an argument is this? As Wittgenstein has commented 
IIH· I l' .. • h ' e·• • •• ·•bl ?Jf 11 Th• 
· · C2>,W can · ,: :gene.na ize :t e "·~ case s:o ir:r:e9·pqnit;:i . y. • .. : : e 
analogical argument is, as a matter of fact, only a very weak induc-
tive argumento It is based on only a single instance (that of my own 
case) of the occurrence of the phenomenon in question (the sensation of 
pain)o This argument actually supplies very weak logical justification 
for the conclusion .that other people mean the same thing by 'pain' that 
I do, or that they experience any sensation even remotely similar to my 
owno 
On the traditional view then, the philosopher who is interested in 
the truth accurately stated, must affirm, unequivocally, that certain 
areas of our language are actually private languages, it being possible 
for each person to know only what he means by ·such words as 'pain', 
since only he may directly "observe" the thing he names by that wordo 
That is, he must affirm the following two propositions~ (1) "Only I 
can know whether I am in pain", (2) "I cannot know whether anyone else 
is in pain"; and also, what follows from these first two: (3) "No one 
can teach another or learn from another the meanings of words like 
'pain"' and (4) "It is possible that we all mean something different 
by words 1 ike 'pa in"' o 
It should be clear that the traditional view must be rejected 
because these consequences shown to follow from it are unacceptableo 
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That only I can know whether I am in pain is clearly false; qth~rs 
quite often know that I am in pain, just as I quite often know that 
others are in pain: "Just try "!'.'."oirioa:,1;;j,a}1~case ...,.};to do1.,1btnsomeone 
1el:aeit,f fear or pain.1112 
Of course it is possible for someone to conceal his pain from me 
indefinitely, as it is possible for me to conceal by pain from others, 
but this fact lends no support to the traditionalist position that it is 
logically impossible for someone else to know whether L:am in pain, or 
vice-versa .. 
That another isin pain can be observed in 
innumerable cases, as when one sees a child 
spill boiling water on himself, and hears 
his uncontrollable cry .. Tq describe such 
observations as inferential, much less 13 
dubiously inferential, would be perverse., 
The Behaviorist Alternative 
However, if the traditional view is rejected then the alternative 
seems naturally to suggest itself that sensation words refer to 
people's behaviot;'o If 'pain', when I say "He is in pain", does not 
name an item or occurrence hidden within the privacy of the other 
party's consciousness (since, on that view I could never be entitled 
to make the assertion), then it must mean what I can observe, namely 
his c~ing, moaning, grimmacing, or other characteristic pain-behavior., 
Or, in other words, sensation words must be the names for behavior syn-
dromes, it seems., On this view, then, to use a simple example, 'pain' 
simply means 'crying'• Were this the case, the puzzles generated by the 
traditional view would dissolve., If 'pain' simply meant 'crying 1 ,then 
the teaching and learning of such words by ordinary ostensive definition 
would s,eem to present no ·problem, since the behavfo.ti::which is the refer• 
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ent of the word is publicly obsertable, just as dogs and sandboxes are. 
Neither would one be required to assert that no one could know whether 
another were in pain, or that we might all mean something different by 
the word 1 pain 1 o 
But this view generates puzzles no less serious, and perhaps more 
quickly recognizable, than those of the traditional viewo First, there 
is the fact that there can be pain-behavior without any pain. One may 
pretend to be in pain, exhibiting all the characteristic behavior, 
merely in order to avoid some unpleasant duty, for example, or sham 
being in pain as part of a dramatic performance. Second, there is the 
fact, mentioned earlier, that there may be pain without any overt 
pain-behavior. Children are very early taught to suppress crying, for 
example, .and there are such cases as someone's being injured and in 
severe pain yet concealing the fact, perhaps to avoid unduly alarming 
others. In general, t.hls behaviorist position is open to the fatal 
objection that . ,,, .. . ,, ... ,. 
if:theL:(lccurrence of a sensation is a matter 
of behavior, then the manifestly.false conclu-
sion follows that from an inspection of some-
body's behavior it is always possible to tell 14 
whether or not he is having a given sensation. 
There is also the equally serious objection that if sensation 
words are the names for behavior syndromes, then the speaker would have 
to find out whether he is in pain the same way everyone else does - by 
observing his behavior. But clearly this is not the case, for if it 
makes sense to speak of one's finding out that he is in pain, it must 
be possible to be in pain and not know it, or to be mistaken about 
being in pain .. That is, statements like 11 I think I'm in pain, but I'm 
not sure" and '!I thought I was in pain, but I was mistaken after all" 
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would have to make sense, because the concept "finding something out" 
can only have application in. ,cases in which the thing found out could 
be unknown or in which one could have been mistaken about the matter at 
hand. But, since neither of the above statements makes sense, neither 
can the notion of finding out that one is in pain makes sense. One 
can't be said to find out that he is in pain the same way everyone 
else does, or "to find it out" at all, for that matter. ·something 
which cannot be unknown, cannot be found auto 
But now here is the dilemma: the traditional position is unaccept-
able because according to it no one can know whether another is in pain, 
which is manifestly false .. It seems, however, that if the traditional 
position is rejected, the behaviorist opposite must be accepted .. But 
it too is repugnant, for according to it, one must find out that he is 
in pain the same way everyone else does .. But when I say "It hurts" or 
"I am in pain'', it is clearly not on the basis of having observed my 
own behavior that I do soo It may seem that one or the other of these 
two views must be correct, but neither is acceptableo 
Wittgenstein is generally recognized as having suggested some kind 
of solution to this dilemma (as well as having pointed out the puzzles 
of the two views), but there is considerable confusion as to just what 
he offered. As examples of this confusion and of possible solutions to 
this dilemma which have been offered, two different interpretations of 
Wittgenstein's work on the private language problem in general (and on 
our common language of sensations in particular) will now be examined .. 
First, in Chapter III, the view of George Pitcher and then, in Chapter 
IV, that of Alan Donagan. The choice of dealing with these two inter= 
pretations was made on several grounds. Pitcher's view, as one of the 
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earliest published accounts of Wittgenstein's work in the Philosophical 
Investigations, seems to have been fairly influential., 15 As will be 
shown, however, it generates puzzles no less serious than those of the 
traditional view which it is supposed to solve. Donagan's interpreta-
tion, on the other hand, ·.is· important in that it recognizes some diffi-
culties with Pitcher's view and offers another account as the correct 
interpretation of the Investigations., It too, however, will be seen to 
involve consequences quite unacceptable., What will be shown, and this 
is the final and most important reason for examing these two interpreta-
tions, is that they both involve misunderstandings of the Investigations 
which are similar and apparently, as this similarity suggests, not 
easily avoided when reading the Investigations. Hence, a parellel pur-
pose in Chapters III and IV, and more directly in Chapter v, is to indi-
cate the proper understanding of the relevant portions of the Investi-
gations, which avoids the difficulties of Pitchervs and Donagan's 
views, and also, as we shall see, does offer a solution to the puzzles 
of the traditional view., We proceed now to the examination of the first 
of these two views., 
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C:HAPTER:·:III 
THE 11?iJO .. NAMES 11 VIEW 
George Pitcher's interpretation of Wittgenstein's work on the pri .. 
vate language problem appears primarily .in the chapter entitled "Sensa .. 
tions and Talk of Them" in his book, The Philosophy .2f Wittgenst~ino 1 
The position expressed there I shall refer to as the 11no .. names11 view, 
for reasons which will become obvious. As suggested by the title of 
the book, this view is:'.-'propounded in the name of Wittgenstein, as a 
sympathetic exposition and interpretation of parts of Wittgenstein's 
Philosophical Investigations. 2 . This view is of special importance in 
that it seems to have gained some acceptance among philosophers as an 
accurate description of Wittgenstein's thought and, in some cases,·as 
the correct view, also.3 I hope to show that the no-names view is 
neither correct (ieeo, that i.t generates puzzles of its own), nor an 
accura.te-:description of Wittgenstein Is views' and so L' shall also refer 
to it as "Pitcher's view" for brevity's sake,:rathe~ than as Pitcher's 
interpretation of Wittgenstein's·1view (although Pitcher connnents at the 
end of the chapter than Wittgenstein's ideas "are obviously highly con-
troversial and there are certainly powerful objections which could be 
urged against some of his argumentsel')o 4 
Pitcher sees the no-names theory as a response to the following 
"natural viewi': 
We all constantly experience things which enter 
and leave and re-enter our consciousness, things 
which are d;i.rectly accessible only to ourselveso 
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And there are words in our language to refer to 
riiany of these things - words like 'pain', 'itch', 
1 ache 1 , 1 image 1 , 'fear 1 , 'anger 1 , and many more• 
These are names for things which each of us 
experiences privately: only I feel my toothache, 
for example. You cannet feel my toothache, nor· 
I yours. But your toothache is doubtless quali-
tatively similar to mine, since the structures of 
our bodies are very similar. And so, although 
many words in our language denote physical things 
and events which are publicly observable by all, 
other words denote items in each of our separate 
consciousnesses, things directly observable only 
by the person in whose con~ciousness they occur. 
All this seems undeniablee 
This view is easily recognizable as the traditional view discussed in 
Chapter II, and Pitcher cites the same absurd consequences to follow 
from ite 
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Pitcher's proposal for dealing'.:wtth these unacceptable consequences, 
simply stated, is the suggestion that the mistake of the traditional view 
was in supposing sensation words to be names, when in fact they are not 
names at all; we have no names for sensations. 
In attributing this view to Wittgenstein, Pitcher of course pre-
sents his exposition by drawing heavily on the Philosophical Investiga-
tions, but our immediate task must be to get clear about just what the 
no-names view j,nvolves, and discussion of Pitcher's justification for 
attributing this view to Wittgenstein will be reserved for a later 
chapter. 
Genuine Names 
First, it is important to note that Pitcher refers to a · : 
11non-tr:i.vial" sense of "names", and a merely "trivial" one, as in the 
following passages: 
[Wittgenstein] is not denying that there is -a 
(trivial) sense in which 'pain', for example, 
is the name of a sensation.6 
The notion that pain is the name, in a 
non-trivial sense, of a private sensation 
proves to be a decided hindrance [to seeing 
the actual uses of the word].7 
The explanation Pitcher offers of this distinction is that the 
trivial sense in which sensation words like 'pain' are names is that 
'pain' denotes a sensation, as 'five' denotes 
a number, as 'understanding' denotes a mental 
process, and as virtually every word denotes 
something - that is, pain is a sensation word 
and has uses closely allied with 'twinge', 
'ache', 1 tickle', and the other sensation words 9 
just as 'five' is a number word and has uses 
closely allied with 'one'~ 'twov, 'ten', and 
the other number wordso This much is obvious 
and no one would wish to deny ito 8 
And the following is apparently to be taken as the non-trivial or 
genuine sense in.which a word can be a name: 
When a word is the name of something, I learn 
what it means by having other people point 
out examples of it to me or by observing what 
they apply it to, and then by going on myself 
to apply the word to further exampleso9 
These two passages make it clear that in Pitcher's view the two 
senses of 'name' come to this: there is the loose or insignificant 
use of 'name' in which a word is a name in name only, i.e., the sense 
in which anything which can serve as the subject of a sentence inay be 
called a name, as could 'five' in the sentence "Five is greater than 
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two", or 'understanding' in 11My understanding of the matter is thatooo 11 , 
or in other words, the sense in which the word 'name' is just equiva-
lent to 1 grannnatical substantive'. And then there is the genuine, sig-
nificant, sense of 'name' in which a name may be thought of as a label~ 
i.e., in those cases in which the word may be learned by means of osten-
sive definitions. 
In the Hallmark ..Hill ,Qf ~ production of th~ play !!Teacher, _ 
. Teacher" .a tutor attempts to teach a retarded boy to speak (and· write) 
by actually placing printed signs bearing individual words such as 
'chair', 'table', and 'fireplace' around the room on the objects 
designated by these names, after having failed in attempts with finger 
pointing and gestures. This example shows the way in which the notion 
of ostensive definition involves the model of names as labels. 
Apparently, Pitcher would count as genuine names only those words 
which the teacher could actually have printed as labels and attached 
to individual objects. Thus, 'five', 'understanding', and 'pain' are 
not genuine name:S.e 
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Notice that Pitcher's characterization of names and naming is 
precisely that of the traditional view examined in Chapter II. There 
is only one kind of word significantly to be called a 'name', exem-
plified by such words as the names for pieces of furniture and people's 
namese Although Pitcher's characterization of what a name is does not 
differ f;om the traditional view, he does, however, disagree with that 
view in suggesting that some apparent names (e.g., 'pain') are not 
genuine namese This distinction between apparent and genuine names, 
then, is the first major aspect of the no-names view. 
The Privacy of Sensations 
The second major aspect of Pitcher's view is also suggested by the 
two p!issages already, quo.ted in which he referred to b'n,Lsenses of 'nanie' e 
In the first of those, recall, he said that Wittgenstein did hat deny a 
trivial sense in which 'pain' is the name of a sensation, and in the 
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second he said that the noti@n of 'pain as the name, in a non-t~ivia1 
sense, of a private sensation was a hindrance to understanding that _ 
word~s actual uses. These two passages suggest that Pitcher makes no 
distinction between :,. sensations·:, and -'·private sensations:•, or in other 
words that he accepts without question the proposition .!.sensations are 
private'• Since, according to the second passage, Pitcher says that 
the word 'pain' can be the name, in a trivial sense, of a "private 
sensation", then a part of Pitcher's view is that sensations are, in 
fact, private., 
This part of his view he makes explicit in other passages, such as 
the following: 
Everyone acknowledges that sensations are private, 
that no one can experience another person's sen-
sations, so that the special felt quality of each 
person's sensations is known to him alone and to 
no other.10 
Wittgenstein will maintain that the privacy of 
pain makes a great deal of difference to the way 
in which 1 pain 1 denotes a kind of sensation.11 
According to Pitcher then, the proposition 'sensations are private' is 
a true statement because no one can experience another person's sensa~ 
tions; and thus, each person knows something in his own case which he 
cannot know in the case of another person, viz .. , the 11s.pecial felt 
quality" of his own sensations (i .. e .. , what his own sensations feel 
like). 
This second element of Pitcher's view also echoes the traditional 
approach. Sensations are objects of a sort (they have qualities), 
but of a special sort. They are private objects, open only to the 
"view" of their possess~r, rather than public objects like chairs, 
dogs, and sandboxes. At this point Pitcher is in very much the same 
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position as the traditionalist, affirming that (genuine) names are 
words which refer to objects, which are what the words mean, and that 
pains, itches, and other sensations are private objects. 
The next step in the traditional view was that, therefore, names 
must be conferred on these sorts of objects privately, i.e., that there 
must be a sort of private ostensive definition by which we teach our-
selves names like 'pain'• The puzzles thus generated by the traditional 
view (e.ge, that one can never know whether another is in pain) were 
those comprising the: affirmation that certain areas of our common 
language are actually private. Pitcher's answer, however, is that such 
a private language is not possible, and his argument involves calling 
into question the notion of private ostensive definition, which must 
be involved in a private language. 
Private Ostensive Definition: 
The· Memory Arguntent 
Pitcher's characterization of the point at issue here is the 
following: 
A defender of View V [the traditional view] 
might offer the followingoeeSuppose a man 
suddenly experiences a sensation E that he 
has never had beforee He can focus his atten-
tion on it and give it the name 'E'. This 
corresponds to an ostensive definition that 
one person might give another of the name of 
something publicly observable, only here the 
person gives it to himself, and instead of 
pointing physically to the thing named, as in 
a standard ostensive definition, he points to 
it mentally. Then he may even keep a diary 
and write down the sign 'E 1 whenever he 
experiences the same sensation again, noting 
the time and place of its occurrence.12 
This, of course, is a general form of just what the traditionalist 
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must count as a description of the way in which words 1ikg !pain! ijrg 
learned. The objections which will be raised to the process descri'be<;l 
here apply to any notion of private ostensive definition and, ·2 fortiori, 
to the case of actual words in use in our common language. 
The primary argument offered by Pitcher against the process 
described in the abqve example is that 
The alleged diarist has no way whatever of 
knowing whether he always applies the sign 
'E' to a sensation which is the same as 
the original one, or ••• to a different one 
each time, or sometimes ••• to the same sen-
sation, sometimes to a different one.13 
The reason the diarist has no way of knowing .. whether he has made a 
correct entry of the sign 'E' is that he will make such an entry when-
ever it seems to him that the same sensation has recurred, but he will 
have no way of knowing whether his impression that the same sensation 
has 
may 
The proponent of the traditional view recurred is correct (l'l;__, .. not. 
<l:' 
reply that all the dftst must do is remember the original sensa-
tion c<;>rrectly, but the point here is that if he has·nc;, way of checking 
the correctness of his memory, then having the impression that this 
sensation is the same as the original, E, is what must count as making 
a ''correct" entry in the diary. But that means that the occurrence of 
any sensation.whatever may be noted in the diary as 'E', so long as 
the diarist has the impression that it is the same as the originale 
In other words, there can be no distinction here between the sensa-
tion 1 s being the same and merely seeming the same, and thus: .no distinc-
tion between a correct and an incorrect entry in the diary, i.e., use 
of the sign 1 E1 e The diarist 
might always "make a mistake" in identifying 
his sensations, now putting an 'E' down in his 
book when he has sensation E, now when he has 
a different one T, and so on; and there is no 
conceivable way that he could tell he was 
doing it ... But then we cannot speak of his 
making a mistake at alt;,nor therefore of 
his using the sign 'E' correctly or incorrectly 
••• [but] in order for a sound or mark to be 
a word it must be possible to use it correctly 
or incorrectly: there must be some circum-
stances in which it would be correct to use:~it, 
and others in which it would be incorrect ••• 
[Thus] the concept of correctness and 
incorrectness does not apply to [the diarist's] 
mark 'E'; therefore, that mark cannot be a 
word or sign of any kindi and a foritiori not 
the name of a sensation. 4 
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In this way the notion of private ostensive definition, which was a 
cornerstone of the traditional view that parts of our common language 
are private, is apparently struck down. The idea of someone directly 
associating a na~ with a private object, e.g., the word 'pain' with 
a particular private sensation, and thus the idea of each person ispri-
vately a~signing a meaning to the word 'pain', proves defective. It's 
defectiveness consists in the fact that, on this view, it would be 
possible that each time one said "I am in pain", he might be expressing 
a different sensation and would have no way of knowing it, and so 
'pain' could not be said to be the n,ame of any particular sensation at 
all. This then, i,s the third major ¢lement of the no-names view, 
that private objects cannot be named. 
We now have before us all of the major premisses of the no-names 
view. First, that names are words which refer to objects, which label 
them, and which therefore can be learned by means of ostensive defini-
tions. Second, that sensations (such as pains and tickles) are private 
objects rather than public ones (such as dogs and sandboxes). And 
third, that private objects cannot have names as can public objects, 
because the: .notion of private ostensive definitions by which they 
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would be given names is defective (as shown by the "~mory ~rgument"). 
Pitcher's conclusion, given these premisses, is obvious: words like 
I 
'pain', and 'tickle', i.e., the sensation words of our language, are 
not really names of sensations. 
What must next be explained is what the no-names view of the actual 
role of sensation words is, and what part, if any, sensations play in the 
the language. But before going on to that part of Pitcher's exposition, 
the implied criticism of the traditional view which is present in the 
no-names argument above should be noted. As mentioned earlier, the 
first two propositions of the no-names view, (1) that names function 
like labels and (2) that; sensations are private, are also affirmed by 
th~ traditional view. Where the traditional view has gone wrong then, 
according to .Pitcher's account; is in supposing that all the important 
. words of our language, incorrectly including sensation words, are 
names. The traditionalists are thus seen as having failed to notice 
what Wittgenstein referred to as the "multiplicity of language-games", 
i.e., the fact that there are many different kinds of words (not just 
names and "parts-of-names") and many different kinds of uses of the 
individual words and sentences of language (a theme which occupies a 
major portion of the early part of Philosophical Investigations). 
Thus, in putting forth the argument that words like 'pain' are not 
names, Pitcher can also be seen as making this more general point, by 
indicating one case in which apparent names ('pain', 'tickle') are not 
(genuine) names at all. 
Thus, the solution offered by the no-names view to the puzzles 
generated by the traditionalists is that, if one recognizes sensation 
words not to be names, it no longer seems to follow that the language 
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of sensation words is private, i.e., that I cannot know whether another 
is in pain, nor he I, and so fortho Of course, what must now be _, :, 
explained by the proponent of the no.-names view is the actual use of 
words like 'pain': What do they refer to? How are they taught and 
learned? 
In the beginning of this part of his exposition, Pitcher makes two 
preliminary points. First, that the view he is expressing 
is not denying that when a person isdin pain, 
he very often and perhaps always feels some-
thing frightful [and] terribly important ••• 
[but] is only denyingooothat the word 'pain' 
names or designates [in any genuine s1nse] 
this something that the person feels. 5 
In other words, this first point is that the no-names view is not one 
of "ontological behaviorism"; there are, Pitcher has before indicated, 
private sensations. 
The second preliminary point is that these private sensations have 
absolutely no part in the language: 
[I]n the numerous language-games we play with the 
word 'pain', private sensations play no partooo 
The private sensations, whatever they may be, 
play no part at allaooprivate sensations do not 
enter in. They are completely unknown to us; we 
have no idea what he [the speaker] might be feel-
ing - what the beetle in his box might be likeoo• 
We proceed in exactly the sf~ way no matter what 
his sensations may be like. 
But if it is not sensations which enter into the language-game, 
then it is, according to Pitcher, behavior: 
What does play a part in pain language games 
1s pain behavioreaoand pain comforting 
behavior .... in short, the external circum-17 
stances in which the word 'pain' is usedo 
Just as in the case of the behaviorist view discussed earlier, the 
alternative here seems to be the only one: if sensation-words are not 
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the names of (private) sensations, then what they must refer to, in 
some sense, is behavioro Pitcher however, recognizing the difficulties 
involved in thinking of sensation words as the names of behavior syn-
dromes, warns that he does not intend to make the same mistake~ 
We must not make the mistake .... of assuming that 
'pain' must denote something, and that if it 
does not denote a private sensation, then it 
must denote some natural pain behavior which may 
accompany one's use of the word .. 18The word 
'pain' does not denote anything. 
The explanation Pitcher does offer of our actual use of sensation 
words like 'pain' does not seem to escape entirely the difficulties of 
behaviorism howevero His position takes into account the following 
asymmetry between first and third person uses of sensation words .. 
First person sensation statements (e .. g .. , 11 1 am in pain") may be con-
sidered as replacing natural pain behavior, and as functioning in much 
the same way as a moan or grimace, or as a request for assistance or 
compassion, or as performing any of a number of other functions, 
depending upon the context of the situationo The point is that in 
all of these cases the statement is an avowal, ioee 9 is not the identi-
fication or description of an object (and so there is no possibility 
of the speaker's being mistaken about his being in pain) .. 
Third person sensation statements 9 on the other hand, are subject 
to error; one may be mistaken about another's being in pain, but "we 
at least sometimes know - and with certainty - that another person 
is in pain, andoouany view which denies this possibility is so far 
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wrong"o What constitute cases of this latter sort, cases of our 
knowing with certainty that another is in pain, are the "circumstances", 
"surroundings", or the "wider situation11 in which the pain behavior 
occurs. That_ is, there are situations or surroundings in which no doubt 
as to the other's pain is rational (such as the example given in the 
last chapter of the child's spilling boiling water on himself), and 
then there are contexts in which the circumstances may warrant some 
doubt. 
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The no-names view then, in summary, asserts (1) that for a word to 
be a (genuine) name it must be possible to define the word ostensively, 
(2) that sensations are private objects, (3) that the notion that a 
private ostensive definition gives a word meaning is confused, and con-
cludes, (4) that, therefore, sensation words cannot be names in a 
genuine sense; and finally, (5) the no-names view asserts that sensa-
tion words do not refer to anything at all but rather in first person 
uses, replace natural behavior, and in third person uses are made on 
the basis of observed behavior patterns and the contexts in which they 
occur .. 
Such then is, very briefly, Pitcher's account of our use of sensa-
tion words. His positive account is much more detailed than this brief 
description would suggest and contains much that is valuable, and to 
which this account does not do justice .. But only this short summary 
seems necessary - because the no-names view has already generated 
puzzles which outweigh any positive achievementso 
Puzzles Generated by the No-Names View 
As we have seen, the no-names view does not entail the manifestly 
false conclusions of the traditional view (that only I can know whether 
I am in pain, etco),,and ·.thus may appear to offer a solution to those 
puzzles. But it avoids those difficulties by the;assertion that 9 as a 
matter of fact, we have no names for sensations. This contention, 
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although perhaps less bothersome·~than the view it supplants, is itself 
quite puzzling. The disclosure that 'pain' is not really the name of'_ a 
sensation !;leems quite difficult to accept; it is counter to the seem~ 
ingly obvious fact that 'pain', 'tickle', 'itch', etc.,~ names of 
sensationso Of more significance than this rather vague misgiving 
however, is the puzzle created by speaking of an area of experience 
about which nothing can be said in any case: 
When "I am in pain11 .is a description of one's 
inner state, it is most certainly not the pur-
pose of this description to tell the hearer what 
the objects before the speaker's consciousness 
feel like, what the nature of his private sensa-
tions areo No words can ever do that. 20 
Just as puzzling is the fact that this is to be an area of experience 
about which nothing can be known except in one's own case: "His pri,-
vate sensations ... are completely unknown to--.us; we have no idea what 
they might be like11 ..21 · Here we find the sense in which Pitcher's 
no-names view seems not to avoid the puzzles of behaviorism: his view 
rules out of the language game what seem::; to be the most important part, 
sensations. That sensations play no part in.the language of sensations 
is self-contradictory. 
As mentioned at the outset, these views are put forth by Pitcher 
as Wittgenstein's views of the Investigations. Thd.s no-names view seems 
to µave gained some support, whether as Wittgenstein's or not, as indi-
cated by this passage from Wallace To Matson's ! History of Philosophy: 
Sensation::; do not have names at allooeif our 
sensations did have names, as opposed to 
descriptions by causes, we could never commu-
nicate with each other about thema22 
This view has also been criticised as that of Wittgenstein: 
Wittgenstein is driving at the conditions that 
are necessary for a common language in which 
pain can be ascribed to persons, the 
consequent need for criteria for the 
ascription of pain, and the effects of 
this upon the use of the word 'pain' 
of our conunon language. Hence his 
obsession with the expression of pain~ 
But he errs through excess of zeal when 
this leads him to deny that sensations 
can be recognized and bear names.23 
It should be clear that the no-names view is, in fact, unacceptable, 
but the purpose of a portion of Chapter V will be to show that this 
view is not Wittgenstein's, and thus-that criticism of the view that 
sensations cannot have names is, however valid, not criticism of 
Wittgensteinvs view of the Investigationso 
In closing, the view which has been examined in this chapter 
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perhaps should be put once more in terms of its position among possible 
alternative 'Views within the private language problem .. The no-names 
view occupies the position of affirming that, although there is a 
realm of private data or knowledge which might serve as a subject matter 
for a private language, still such a language is impossible (and thus 
one does not speak a private language when he speaks of his sensations 
or emotions) because of the defectiveness of the idea of private osten-
sive definitions which would give such words private meanings. 
We have now seen one of the two interpretations to be examined of 
Wittgenstein's work on the private language problem in the Investiga--. 
tions. We have also seen that it generates serious puzzles of its own .. 
We shall turn in the next chapter to the work of Alan Donagan, which 
offers a criticism of Pitcher's interpretation and attempts to supplant 
it with another aimed at clearing up the puzzles of both the traditional 
and no-names views. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE COMPOSITE VIEW 
Alan Donagan offers his own interpretation of Wittgenstein's 
Investigations. in his article titled "Wittgenstein on Sensation", 1 
using as a foil both the traditional and no-names viewso His own 
characteri;zation of the traditional view, below, he labels 
"Cartesianism": 
Each man hasoooprivileged access to his own 
sensations. Not only does he, and only he, 
have them; but he, and only he directly knows 
that he has themo Others may, with varying 
degrees of certitude, infer that he has a 
given sensation; but he, and only he, knows 
whether he has it or not.2 
And his succinct report of Pitcher's view is this: 
If Pitcher is right, Wittgenstein's position 
comes to this: the p;ivate inner happenings 
that the Cartesians wrongly describe as 
!'sensations" really do exist, but no language 
either does or can have names for themo As 
for sensations, for which we do have words, 
although perhaps not names, they are a 
matter of the behavior of those who have3them, 
and the behavior of others towards themo 
Donagan, of course, is familiar with the difficulties of the tra-
ditionalist position ("according to the Cartesian position, knowledge 
ofthe sensations of others is impossible114) and those of "crude" 
behaviorism ("according to [behaviorism], a man can know what his own 
sensations are only in the way by which others do, namely by observing 
his behavior and circt.nnstances115 )o However, Donagan also has objections 
to Pitcher's "linguistic behaviorism", as we shall seeo 
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Criticism of the No-Names View 
What seems to be Donagan's primary objection to Pitcher's view is, 
I think, a good one, but his reasons for making it indicate a misunder-
standing of Wittgenstein just as serious as that which he correctly 
attributes to Pitcher. The controversy here centers around the inter-
pertation of the following two rather puzzling passages from the 
Investigations: 
Of course, if water boils in a pot, steam comes 
out of the pot and also pictured steam out of 
the pictured poto But what if one insisted on 
saying that there6must be something boiling in 
the pictured pot? . 
It is a misunderstanding to say 'The picture of 
pain enters into the language-game with the;word 
"pain"'o The :Lmage of pain :Ls not a picture 
and this image is not replaceable in the 
language-game by anything that we should call 
a picture., The image of pain certainly enters 
into the language game in a sense; only not 
as a picture/ 
Pitcher's interpretation of these passages, which Donagan quotes, is 
that 
The representation enters inoaehot by any-: 
reference to a mental object behind the 
pain behavior and causing it; but rather 
by a reference to the circumstances, includ-
ing vario~s sorts of sgrroundings, of the 
present pain behavior. 
Now Donagan's abjection here, based on a discussion of the significance 
and proper translation of the passages from the Investigations is that 
This [Pitcher's interpretation quoted above] 
cannot be right. It is true that Wittgenstein 
denied that pain is imaginatively represented 
by a ,picture of a mental object behind the 
pain :behavior, but that is not the same as 
denying that a ine.ntal object is referred to • 
., •• At the very least, Wittgenstein was main-
taining that, in the Vorstel!ung ['image' in 
the translation quoted above; 'imaginative 
representation' is the translation Donagan 
prefers] of pain, reference is made to 
something other .than the external circum-
stances depicted in the 9Bild ['picture'] 
that corresponds to it. · 
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Donagan's objection can be stated very simply then, if I understand 
him correctly. Pitcher's no-names view, in claiming that we have no 
genuine names for sensations, asserts that in our use of words like 
'pain' no reference is or can be made to our actual (private) sensa-
tions, and that that is why such words as 'pain' are not really names 
of sensations. Donagan 1 s objection is that Wittgenstein never said 
that the word 'pain' does not refer to a sensation (and that he would 
be wrong if he had) although he did say that pain-behavior plays an 
important role in the language game. · 10 In fact, Donagan points out, 
Wittgenstein warned against just such a misinterpretation of his views. 
An even simpler form of Donagan's primary objection would then seem to 
be that, contrary to Pitcher's view, sensation words like. 'pain' are 
names of sensations in a significant sense. Thus, Donagan's view 
has~he initial advantage over the no-names view of avoiding the puzzle 
of seeming to de:ny an obvious fact, viz., that we do have names for 
sensations. 
Donagan's Exposition of the Composite View 
Donagan's positive account of the workings of sensation words 
turns out,,as we shall see, to be a sort of composite of Cartesianism 
O .• e., the traditional view of Chapter II) and behaviorism, and so 
I shall refer to it as the "composite view''• The first major element 
of this view Donagan puts forth under the heading ''Wittgenstein's 
Concessions to Cartesianism", and here the view is defended that sensa-
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tions are private occurrences. 
That .!sensations are private' is a true statement is shown by 
several "grammatical facts", according to Donagan. First, there is 
the fact that "one of the criteria of identity of the same instance 
of a sensation or bodily injury is that it be the sensation or injury 
of the same individua11111 (hence, the Cartesian assertion that another 
person cannot have my pains). Second, "often only the man who has a 
sensation can tell that he has it ••• it makes no sense to wonder 
whether he is mistaken11 • 12 Donagan recognizes that the Cartesian infer• 
ence that "only I, and not you ••• can know whether I'm having a sensa-
tion1113 does not follow from these "grammatical facts" (since it is 
not always the case that you cannot tell that I have a certain sensa-
tion), but he asserts that 
Wittgenstein would not have denied that the 
· grammatical st;ate~nt "sensations are pri-
vate" is a priori true, when taken as S\.Uil!Iling 
up three reminders: (i) that it is nonsense 
to suppose that more than one sentient being 
can·ha''ve;·the· same in:Stanc·e,.of, .. ,a sensat:iOtl.:r· .. , 
(ii) that if a man has a sensation, it may 
be that only he can tell whether he is having 
it; and (iii) that when a man reports that he 
has a sensati£~' it is nonsense to suppose 
him mistaken. 
That Wittgenstein conceded to Cartesianism that sensations are 
occurrences Donagan takes to be shown·by passages such as the follow-
ing, in which Wittgenstein apparently rejects any dispositional 
al}alysis: 
·~Yes, but thei-e is something there all the 
same accompanying my cry of pain. And it 
is on account of that that I utter it. 
And this something is what is important -
and frightful.' Only whom are y5 informing 
ofthis? And on what occassion? 
Donagan takes this passage to indicate that the remarks in inverted 
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commas (and thus to be attributed to Wittgenstein's imaginary interlocu-
tor rather than to Wittgenstein himself) Wittgenstein would have con-
sidered to be a legitimate philesophical reminder (to a dispositional 
behaviorist) that 
the important difference between .an analgesic 
and a gag is not that the analgesic suppl!'esses 
a disposition and the gag only ·suppresses 
behavior, but that the analgesic removes what 
accompanies·the disposition. It is the 
accompaniment, not the disposition, that is 
frightful. 16 
Thus, the first main element of the composite view is that sensations 
are private occurrences which accompany behavior and dispositions to 
behave in characteristic ways. 
The second major element of the composite view comes under the 
heading "Cartesian Doctrines Rejected By Wittgenstein"• In this sec-
tion Donagan inc1udes a discus·sion of Wittgenstein's memory argument 
against'~the possibility of a private language (which comprised a part 
of the no-names view of the last chapter) in which Donagan concludes. 
that the: memory argument is, as a matter of fact, fallacious. Donagan"'·s 
objections to the, ,memory argument may be passed over for the present, 
however, since no part of the composite view actually hinges upon its 
validity or invalidity. The fact is, Donagan points out, that "sensa-
tions are things with names in our common language, not things nameable 
byh 1 1 1111 t e payer a one. 
Thus,· the Cartesian or traditional doctrine rejected by the com-
posite view is that the meanings of names of sensations are incommuni-
cable. That not only the word 'sensation', but all the words and 
phrases by which various kinds of sensations are referred to belong to 
our common language and thus do not constitute a private language, as 
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Here, however, ar;i;ses.:,the p:roblem for. the composite view:: "in 
view of the fact that sensations areouprivate, it is p1,1zzling how this 
19 truism can be true." If sensations are indeed private occurrences, 
and~.if the no-names solution that sensation words are not names of 
these private objects is rejected, how avoid the conclusion of the tra-
ditionalist that the areas of our language dealing with sensations are 
private? 
The composite answer is that sensations must be named by means of 
the behavior associated with them,. but that the actual referent or 
meaning of sensation words is the private sensation, not its overt 
inanifestatio.ns: 
Each kind of painful sensation has certain 
natural physical expressionseeoand a word 
is made the name of a specific pain by lay-
ing down that it shall stand for whatever 
has certain specific natural expressions .. 20 
What has them will, of course, be private .. 
The problem here, Donagan is quite aware of: 
Is it not flatly self-contradictory to hold 
on the one hand that sensations ai;e private 
and non-dispositional, and on. the·other that 
they are named by reference to such exterrtah 
circumstances as their natural,expressions? 
Donagan believes Wittgenstein to have offer~d a coherent, though 
gnomic, theory to explain this apparent contradiction. It's key, he 
believes, is to be found in the following passage from the Investiga-
tions .. 
:1,Btit you· will surely admit that there is a 
difference betweenA?ain-behavior · accompanied 
by pain and~ pai:q; ,be~avior without any pain?' - · 
Admit it? What' greater difference could there 
be? - 'And yet you again and again reach the 
conclusion that the sensation itself is a 
nothing.' - Not at all. It is not a some-
thing, but not a nothing either! The con-
clusion was only that a nothing would serve 
just as well as a something about which 
nothing could be said. We have only 
rejected the grammar which tries to force 
itself on us here.22 
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The formulation of the composite view comes out in Donagan's exp~an-
ation and interpretation of the above remark that pain 11 is not a some-
thing but not a nothing either"• Pain is not a something because, 
although there is no greater dif£erence than pain behavior without 
any pain and pain behavior with that frightful accompaniment, still 
"that frightfuJ accomp~miment only enters our conunon language as what 
is naturally expressed by pain-behavi()r11 • 23 "What accompanies behavior, 
inasmuch as it is private, plays no part in determining the meanings of 
th d d h h f . '' 24 0 D e wor s an p rases tat re er to sensations. ~ as onagan puts 
the matter in other words: "provided what a man truthfully reports as 
pain is always what he would naturally express by pain-behavior, it 
matters not at all what it is that he truthfully reports as pain11 • 25 
Donaganvs explanation of the sense:'.in which pain is, however, not 
a nothing either, ¢ome.s,~with his interpretation of Wittgenstein vs 
beetle-in-the-box example which, recall, played an important part in 
the:,no-names view of the ,previous chapter (and which is quoted there). 
Donagan paraphrases the parable and·:·then quotes the linel> "The thing 
in the box has no place in the language game at all; not even as a 
something"o 26 Donag;m goes on to quote the final part of this passage 
(which Pitcher omitted): 
That is to say: if we construe the grammar 
of the expression of sensation on the model 
of 'object and name' the object drops out of 
consideration as irrelevant.27 
What Donagan believes to be involved here is a "slip" by Wittgen-
stein into dismissing altogether the private accompaniment of pain 
28 behavior. For the passage, according to Donagan, 
can only mean: if we construe an expression 
like 1 toothache 1 as the name of the frightful 
accompaniment of toothache behavior, then 
what it names, or whether it names anything, 29 
is irrelevant to the meaning of 'toothache'. 
But the "slip" involved here, according to Donagan, is that "In the 
language-game of beetles in boxes there is no place for the utterance, 
'My box has no beetle'; and that is why it does not matter if a box 
30 is empty." In our common language with 'pain' however, we have use 
for ,:~ am not in pain't, 
and one of its uses is to indicate when one's 
pain behavior is not accompanied by pain. The 
e~istence of the 'object', of that which 
.accompanies natural pain-behavior, is not only 
not irrelevant to the meaning of pain words, 
it is cardinal •. What is irrelevant is not the 
existence of the object but what it happens to 
be. You and I could not have a common.word 
for pain unless our natural pain-behavior was 
accompanied by something frightful; but whether 
that accompaniment is the same for both of us 
or rtot, or even whether it changes or not 31 (provided we do not notice it) is irrelevanto 
Thus, the composite view is that sensations are indeed private 
occurrences, but also that it is by reference to behavior, the 
"external circumstances" of the private occurrence, that we are 
able to re£er to the private objects: 
That is, a sensation is defined by reference 
to its external circumstances. Yet it is not 
••• reducible to those external circumstances; 
for it is defined as their private and 
non-dispositional accompaniment ... Whether the 
in~ernal character of what is expressed in 
these ways [e.g., rubbing one's jaws, griIIS..c-
ing] is the same for you as for me is irrel- 32 
evant to the meaning of the word 'toothache'• 
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To review the composite view in its entirety then: (1) it begiT1.s 
by asserting that, contrary to the no-names view, we do have Tl.ames for 
sensations; (2) it also affirms the privacy of sensations, but (3) denies 
the c,onclusion of the traditional view that the language of sensations 
is private, since words like 'pain' are part of our common language and 
their meanings are thus not iTl.commtinicable; and (4) it offers as a solu-
tion to the appc;irent contradiction involved in (1), (2), and (3) the 
assertion that a word is made the na.me of a specific pain by laying 
down that it shall stand for whatever has certain specific natural 
expressions. This view raises difficulties, as we shall seeo 
Puzzles Generated by the 
Composite View 
What seems to be the primary puzzle of this view is understanding 
(4) above, and so I have made liberal use of Donagan 9 s own words in 
putting forth this view, in an effort to avoid misrepresenting hls posi-
tion. However I think the puzzle here is one which no amount of 
explanation could resolve. If 'pain' means 1·1that which has these 
natural expressions", how can it niean, "the private, non-dispositional 
accompaniment" of these natural expressions? That is, if one holds 
that the "internal character" of what has certain:,natural expressions 
may rtot "be the/ same for you as for me", may even not always be "the 
same" for one individual, then there is no sense in which a word can 
mean "what has certain natural expressions", for nothing has been 
identified which has certain natural expressions. 
To put the matter in yet another way, which may make the puzzle 
here clearer, the composite view has:·,not avoided a form of the puzzle 
of the traditional view that what I call 'pain', you might call 
1 tickleJ. If the word 'pain'~ the "private accompaniment of pain 
behavior",·and if the "character" of this private accompaniment might 
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be different with each use of the word, then it must be said that the 
word might mean something different with each use. But, on the other 
hand, if one tries to avoid this conclusion by saying that it does not 
matter what the accompaniment is like, so long as the behavior is 
appropriate (e.g., in the case of pain, so long as it is crying, grimac-
ing, etc.) then the criterion for the correct application of the word 
will be the occurrence of this behavior in the appropriate circumstances 
or surroundings (i.e., not in a dramatic performance, etc.). But in 
this case, the private accompaniment~ drop out as irrelevant, and 
one is in Pitcher's. position, which is just what Donagan wants to avoid. 
Thus, the composite view does not avoid the.puzzles of.the traditional 
and no-names views; rather, it involves the composite puzzle that on 
the one hand 'pain' might always mean something different, and on the 
other the sensation, the "private accompaniment" of behavior, plays no 
part in the language game. Thus, the composite view must be rejected 
also. 
It should be noted here also that Donagan's composite view 
implicitly agrees with the e~planation of names found in Pitcher's no 
names view. For Donagan as for Pitcher a name refers to an object, and 
the object, the referent of the word, is the meaning of the name. In 
Pitcher's view, g·iven that this is what is involved in names and naming; 
the privacy of sensations:makes it impossible for these private objects 
to have names. Donagan, on the other hand, agrees that sensations are 
private, but asserts that they do have na~s. That Donagan agrees that 
the meaning of a name is its referent, can be seen in the fact that his 
composite view is supposed to explain how a sensation word can~ the 
private object (the "accompaniment" of behavior), but at the same time 
be defined by reference to its "external circumstances". 
We have now seen two different interpretations of Wittgenstein's 
work on sensations and the privaie language problem, each of which has 
led to puzzles of its own. The first part of the next chapter will be 
aimed at showing that neither of these interpretations Correctly·::repre-
sents Wittgenstein's view. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE COl-iMON ERROR OF THE TRADITIONAL, 
NO .. NAMES, AND COMPOSITE VIEWS 
This chapter has several objectives. We have now before us three 
different views of nam.e,s, naming, and the private language problem, all 
of which are unacceptable. The::,.latter two views have been offered as 
aiternat;ives .: to the traditional view and as attempts to solve the 
puzzles generated by it. In this chapter I hope, first, to show that 
(and how) Pitcher and Donagan::have been led to misinterpret Wittgenea ·~ 
stein's Investigations, and at the same time to bring into clearer form 
the positions of each·of these views with respect to the private 
language problem, per se. The final portion of this chapter will be 
devoted to suggesting a solution (Wittgenstein's) to the puzzles of the 
traditional. view which avoids t1:ie difficulties of the two alternatives 
we have seen. As is evi4ent in the previous discussions of their 
views, it is primarily the interpretation of a few key passages from 
Wittgenstein which will be involved in the criticism of the interpreta-
tions of Pitcher and Don1;1gan. 
·criticism of the No-Names Interpretation 
The first major element of the no-names view was the identification 
of the "essence of naminglf, so to speak, or the character of genuine 
names,:as opposed to names in a trivial sense. The criticism of the 
traditional view thus implied was the failure to notice the variety of 
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kinds of words that there are, or in other words, the mistake of thi,n~-
ing all words function in the same way, as names which refer to objects 
which are the meanings of the words., 
Of course Wittgensteih ... had much to say about the variety of 
"language-games" and, as seen in Chapter II, used Augustine as an exam-
ple of someone who used a too narrow view of language, thinking all 
. 1 
words were nameso Pitcher obviously seized upon this aspect of 
Wittgenstein's work .. What Pitcher seems to have missed, however, is 
the idea, which Wittgenstein also put forth, that there are many 
different kinds of "naming-games" as well. It is not too difficult to 
understand how Pitcher might have done this, as a look at several 
passages from the Investigations will show., 
Wittgenstein's stress on the idea of the many different language 
games is evident in the passages quoted".in the previous note and in 
many others such as the following: 
But how many kinds of sentence are there? •• ., 
There are countless kinds; and this multiplicity 
is not something fixed, given once for all ..... 
new language-gameseoecome into existence, a~d 
others become obsolete and get forgotten .... 
If you do not keep the multiplicity of 
language~games in view you will perhaps be 
inclined to3ask questions like 'What is a 
question?' o 
In a later passage, Wittgenstein says: 
One thinks that learning language consists in 
giving names to objects viz., to hurru:m beings, 
to shapes, to colours, to pains, to moods, to 
numbers, etc • .,.,.,To repeat~ naming4is something 
like attaching a label to a thing. 
Now it is obvious that the first sentence of this last passage is 
referring to the mistaken view that language is a sort of unitary 
operation, that all words are names, and, thus, that learning language 
consists in learning names of objects - in short the traditional view, 
as an example of which Wittgenstein has used Augustine. But Pitcher, 
it seems, would take the latter part of this passage to indicate some~ 
thing like: it is a mistake to think that all of these (human beings, 
shapes, pains, etc.) are things tha:t·h'.kve names, because naming is 
like attaching a label to a thing, and pains, for example, are things 
which cannot have labels attached to them (because of their private 
nature, and the memory problem)o 
The point of this passage, however, is not to remind someone that 
"realH names are like labels, and that, thus, some things can't have 
them. Rather, the point is to give an example of the kind of thinking 
which may get someone into philosophical difficulty. The significance 
of this passage is more like: Someone th'inks that learning language 
consists in giving names to objects (to people,· shapes, pains, etc.). 
-And, to repeat, this person thinks that naming is like attaching a 
label to a thing (because he thinks that language consists of giving 
names to object~), so he will find difficulty explaining our language 
of sensations because, if he thinks of sensations as objects, they 
will seem to be sorts of private objects. The point here is not that 
we don't have names for human beings, shapes, colours, pains, moods, 
numbe:i:-s, etc., but that not all of these things can be thought of as 
objects, and thus that the model of ilam:i.ng as attaching a label to a 
thing does not apply to all of these cases of naming (it does apply 
to the case -of people, for example). If one thinks that it must, he 
will be forced into philosophical difficulties. 
This interpretation is borne out by the following remarks from· 
Wittgenstein: 
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We call very different things 'names; the 
word 'name' is1:,used to characterize many 
different kinds of use of a word, related 
to one another in many different ways •••. s 
Pitcher quotes this passage himself, but, as seen in Chapter III, 
takes it to be pointing out that some words a.re names "in name only", 
or, as he puts it, are only trivially names. But such an interpreta-
tion ignores the point Wittgenstein took great pains to bring out, and 
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for which he is perhaps most famous: the point that it is a mistake to 
·think that all things called by the same name must have something in 
common (his well-known example is that of the word 1:games")o He 
argued, rather, that for many words one finds "family resemblances" 
among the things to which the word applies, and not a common 11essence11 o 
Pitcher's interpretation makes out Wittgenstein to have identified an 
"essence" of naming and as having recommended the revision of our 
language to distinguish between words which are genuinely names, and 
those which are only imprecisely, or even incorrectly, called 11names11 e 
But this should be recognized as counter to some of the points on 
which Wittgenstein insisted most strenuously. Wittgenstein's remarks 
about the word 'games' must be taken as applying equally to the word 
11names 11 o Wittgenstein specifically forewarned against this kind of 
misinterpretation: 
when philosophers use a word ... 'knowledge' 9 
'being', ue 1object 1 , 'name' - and try to 
grasp the essence of the thing, one must 
always ask oneself: is the word ever actually 
used in this way in the language-game which 
is its original home?~ 
And, as to revising the language, Wittgenstein forewarned against this 
kind of misinterpretation of his work, also~ 
We shall constantly be giving p:i:-ominence to 
distinctions which our ordinary forms of 
language easily make us overlook. This may 
make it look as if we saw it as our task to 
reform language. 
Such a reform for particular practical 
purposes, an improvement in our terminology 
designed to prevent misunderstandings in 
practice,.~ is __ perfee.tly poss,i.ble~ .B_u.t these.. 
are not. the .cases~we tiave .to· .. l:lo_:with •. The_ 
'- .. 
·. izon~~r~o'nlo~llH~!L~~:.C,~Y,H:J.~. at1.h~.;:vh~:m-.l~t1~µ~~e is7 
t~kil~ar1ae.n:11.~';;:f..flllng:r.\n9t~:when .. :1t is doing:.wq:i:;k. 
. ..... .. . .. 
. . . . . 
· One may say then,,. that l'itcher grasped Wittgenstein's criticisms 
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· of the traditional view as having neglected the diversity of language , 
games, but: that Pitcher has 1;1eglected Wittgenstein' si'.'reminders about 
the diversity of naming-games, and this should help explain how Pitcher 
.could have interpreted W:i:.ttgeris.tein's later passages as affirming that 
sensations are private, rather than as opposing that idea. 
After having correctly identified one element of Wittgenstein's 
view, viz., that.the memory argument is intended to establish the 
impossibility of private ostensive definitions, Pitcher quotes the 
passage which, as-we have seen, plays a key role iri the expositions 
of both. Pitcher and Donagan: the beetle-in-the-box example,.8 :The 
portion -of this passS:ge quoted by Pitcher was~ 
Suppose everyone had a box with something in it. 
We call it a beetle. No one can look into any-
one else's box, and everyone says he knows what 
a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. - Here 
it would be quite possible for everyone to have 
something different inhhis box. One might even 
imagine :Such a thing constantly changingo -But 
suppose the word 'beetle' had a use in these 
people·'s language? - If so, it would not be used 
as thennameof a thing. The thing in the box 
has no place in the language-game at all; not 
even as a something: for the box might even be 
empty. - ffat o"Qe can divide through by the thing 
in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. 
This portion is follawed, however, by these lines: 
That is to.say, if we construe the grammar of the 
expression of sensation on the model of 1objec61 
and designation' the object drops out of 
consideration as irrelevant~9 
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Pitcher does not quote this final portion of the beetle-in-the-bo~ pasa·~ ~; 
age, but he must have taken it to mean that names consist of object and 
designation, and that when sensation words are analysed on this model 
the sensation drops out of consideration as irrelevant, and so sensa-
tion words are not names, and sensations play no role in the language 
game •. 
But the purpose of this final portion of the beetle passage is to 
point out that th{~ldng that all names function on the model of labels 
for objects, and thus that sensations are objects, leads to the view 
that sensations must be a sort of private object; but that view leads 
,to the absurd consequence that sensations play no part in our comm.on 
language of sensations. Thus, the point of the whole beetle passage 
is, in othe.r words, that 
since the view that sensad.orts::-i.are private 
allows sensations to have no place in the 
language-game and thereby m:akes it impossi-
ble to give any account of the actual (that . 
-is, the 'public') use of sensation words, we 
must, if we are to-give an account of that 
language•game, rej~ct the view that sensa-
tions are private.IO 
Pitcher, by failing to realize the significance of the final part of 
the beetle-in-the-box example, misses the point of this crucial 
passage entirely. 
We shall return later to the discussion of Wittgenstein's attack 
on the pro·position usensaticms are private", but first we shall turn 
to the interpretation of some of these same passages in Donagan's 
composite view. 
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.Criticism: of the Composite Interpretation 
The preceedirig discussion of the inad,equacy of the ·:no-ngID.es i~terpre.;. 
tation helps thrc;>w light on the inadequacy of Donagan's interpertat;i<>.n 
of Wittgenstein as well. To begin with, recall Pitcher's iil.terpreta• 1 
tion of the steam•coming-out..;of-the•pot passage (quoted on P• 42 of 
this paper) and Donagan's criticism o.f it (p. 43 of this paper). Now 
Donagan, here just;ly criticizes :Pitcher for having taken these passages 
. . . 
to indicate that sensation words do not really refer to sensations, 
but only to behavio.r. We have already seen that it would be incorrect 
to· think of Wittgenstein as having said that some apparent names 
are not really ha.mes, although Wittgenstein was saying that one must not 
th!nk of all names on one inodel: that of object and designation. But 
Donagan, iri af.f irming his valid criticism, neglects this latter point. 
His statement· .of the matter was: 
It is true thatWittgenstein denied that pain 
is imaginatively represented by a picture of 
. a mental object behind the pain-behavior, but 
th~t.ip.not the Saille as 1rny;i.ng that a mental 
· obJect .J.s referred- to... . . 
Thus, here is the nl:i.:sleading nature of Donagan's criticism of Pitcher 
(referred to in note 9, po 52): Donagan, like Pitcher, makes out 
Wittgenstein to have thought of sensations, e.g .. , pains, as mental 
objects~ but that, again, is the very notion Wittgenstein views as 
pernicious. 
Failing to realize this, Donagan manages to misinterpret the 
crucial beetle-in ... the•box passage as well. Since he views Wittgenstein 
as having accepted ·the idea that sensations are private objects, Dona-
gan must, aswe have 1:1een, take Wittgenstein as having "slipped" when, 
in the beetle passage Wittgenstein says "the object drops out of con-
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sideration as irrelevant"• Donagan "corrects" this slip by indic:;:at;i.ng 
·that it is not the existerice·of the object that is irreleva,nt, but .what 
the object happens to be. But Wittgenstein meant just what he said: 
if one construes sensations as private objects (like beetles in private 
boxes) then these "objects:,i can have no place in (public). language 
games, because the. necessai-y public criteria for the presence of such 
an "object"will bemissiq.g. The point aga:Ln, is thal, therefore,one 
must not construe sensations as ''objects" nor, !. fortiori, words like · · 
'pai~', as labels for objectso 
1 That Donagan has missed Wittgenstein I s point abC!>ut the necessary.·· 
criteria for the.application of a word in the beetle-in-the-box passage 
is not surprising, hotii~ver, si.n.ce he missed the same point in Wit:tgen-
stein' s "memory argument", against the possibility of private ostensive 
definitions. This argument was a.part of the no-names view and, 
although Donagan agreed that private ostensive definitions are not wl\at 
are involved ia the use of sensation words in our connnon language, he 
con:tended that the memol".y argument was,·nontheless, fallacious. 
Int.he passage in question here, Wittgenstein had described a 
diarist whowas supposed to associate the sign 'E' with a sensation 
(that ;i;s, give himself. a private ostensive definition) and then keep 
a record of the sensation·!s occurrence. But, Wittgenstein said; . 
. I impress ... on myself [the connection between 
.the sign and the sensation] can only mean: 
this process brings it about that I remember 
the connection right in the future. But in 
the present case I have no criterion of 
.. correctness. One would like to say: What-
ever is going to seem right to me is right, 
and that only 'f2ans that here one can't talk 
about 'right'• 
: "· 
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Donagan'sobjection was that Wittgenstein 
~-pp~f~:r:s·.~·;tot.hav.eveo,n,ifi,oundad, a pl'?yer·tsr .int;\~·:.·-
bil ity to verify his recollection of the mean-
ing of •1E1" with inability to understand what 13 
it would -be for his recollection to be right ••• 
A Cartesian might ••• argue that nothing prevents 
a pJayer of the·E-game from forming the general 
concept of recollection as true and false, and 
from applying that concept to his recollection 
of what sensation he was recording when he wrote 
down a particular sign .. Wittgenstein would 
presumably disagree. But on what ground? The 
unvedfiability of a given recollection does . 
not entail that it is pointless to think of it 
as true or false.,14 
But Wittgenstein's point here is that it is senseless to think of 
the procedure the diarist goes through, marking down an 'E' from time 
to time, as a language game, or of the sign 'E' as a word, because in 
this "language" .there is no such thing as an incorrect use of the sign 
'E'• For a sign to be a word, it must have correct and incorrect uses. 
There must be criteria for its application, which will distinguish 
between correct and incorrect uses .. But in the private 11 language11 .of 
the diarist,. there is no _such thing as identifying an incorrect use 
of 1E1 • 'E' is not a word in a private language for the same reason 
that its analogue (i.ees, a sign with no criterion for its application) 
in. our public language would not be a word. Such a thing is perhaps 
difficult to imagine because in the c,ontext of public language it is so 
obviously a non•wordo But, suppose someone said there was a·::word 1X9 
and that it was to be used when it seemed appropriate, so that people 
went around saying ''I feel X11 ,"Did. you X yesterday?", ''You X! 11 , ·• 1x11 , 
''X is nice•i, and so on. Clearly ~X'" would not be a word.. But this 
point is perhaps difficult to see fm the case of the diarist, although 
the situation ·is the same.: The dtwrist vs "criterion" for using the .. 
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sign ''E' is: "I put down 'E' when what seems to be the same sensation 
recurs"; but that is just the same as "One shall use 'X' when it see~s 
appropriate", and 'E' is no more a word than 'X' would be. The point 
here, has been stated more clearly (and succinctly) by Rush Rhees: 
[ 15 
"_I]f a sign has meaning it can be used wrongly." But in the case of 
the alleged diarist, nothing may count as using the sign 'E' wrongly, 
for there is no criterion by which to establish that an entry in the 
diary is an incorrect one. Thus, Donagan has missed a similar and 
important point in both the beetle and memory passages: there must be 
criteria for the application of a word. 
What should be evident at this point is that the no-names and 
composite views have each interpreted Wittgenstein's Investigations 
correctly on some points, but incorrectly on the more crucial ones, 
and that it is thus the no-names and composite views themselves that 
are rendered unacceptable by the puzzles we have seen to follow from 
them - not Wittgenstein's own view, which remains to be positively 
stated. 
Before going on to this task, it should be helpful, by way of 
review, to set out in schematic form the views that have so far been 
examined. This will also bei_helpful as a means of bringing out some 
elements common to all three of these views and as a means of clarify-
ing·::the positions of these views with respect to the private language 
problem, per se. We have seen then, the followingo 
The traditional view asserts that: 
(1) names refer to objects, which are their meanings; 
(2) sensations are private, 
(3) sensation words are names (we have names for sensations), 
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· and ci:mc:ludes that our language of sensation words is private .. 
The No-Names view asserts that: 
(1), names refer to objects, which are their meanings, 
(2) sensations are private, 
(3) private objects cannot be named (private language is not 
possible), 
and concludes that sensation words are not (genuine) names. 
This second view criticises the first, in Wittgensteinian terms, as 
having failed to note the "multiplicity of language-games", ioeo, as 
having made the mistake of thinking all words are in some sense names, 
erroneously including sensation words, which in fact cannot'~be;: ~ since . 
private objects (sensations) cannot be named. 
The Composite view asserts thatg 
(1) the referent of a word is what it means, 
(2) sensations are private 9 
(3) we have names for sensations 9 
(4) our language of sensations is not private (one can know 
another is in pain) 9 
and concludes that sensations must be defined as "the private 
non-dispositional accompaniments of behavior and dispositions 
to behavior." 
This third view criticises the second as neglecting the obvious fact 
that we do have names for sen·sations, and, incidentally, as being mis-
taken about the impossibility of a private languageo 
It is clear from the above schemata that we have represented here 
three different views of the private language problem. The first view 
makes out our common language of sensations to be, in factl) private •. 
The second,, asserts that a private language is impossible becaqs~ o( 
the difficulty about naming private objects and,~ fortiori, t4at nQ 
part of our commori language is private. The third asserts that, 
although a private language is not impossible, no part of our common 
language is private, for then.it would not be a part of a common, 
public language. 
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Thus, the no-names and composite views agree ·.that we do not have a 
private language (that conclusion of the traditional view is the gen~ 
eral form of its unacceptable consequences), but for different reasons. 
What all three of these views have in common, however, is the acceptance 
of the assertion "sensations are private" (premiss (2) in each of the 
above schemata). But that is the proposition which Wittgenstein sought 
to expose as nonsense. If Wittgenstein's view of the private language 
problem (ieee, his solution to the puzzles of the traditional view) 
were to be stated in one sentence, that sentence would have to be "The 
proposition •sensations are private' is nonsense11 e 
We have seen, in the discussion of how Pitcher and Donagan misin-
terpreted Wittgenstein, certain individual passages which we found were 
directed against the idea that our common language lias:-private areas, 
and others directed against the idea of even the possibility of an 
invented private language. But the most powerful and important 
aspect of Wittgenstein's work in this area is his attack on the very 
idea of a realm of "private experience" which would serve as the sub-
ject matter of a private language, the attack both Pitcher and Donagan 
have missed and thus rendered their views as puzzling as the tradi~., 
tional view they sought to supplant. 
A wider look at the thrust of the Investigations in this area is 
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needed to bring the attack into clear focus. This will show that 
Wittgenstein really has solved the puzzles generated by the traditional 
view (in a way which avoids those of the no names and composite views), 
although quite differently than either Pitcher or Donagan envisioned. 
The Privacy of Sensations 
As we have seen, the idea of the privacy of sensations in:the tra-
ditional view is a result of the following sort of thinking (again 
using the example of the word Vpainv)., No one can feel, experience, 
anothervs pain; only I may experience my pain, and only you yourso 
Thus 9 sensations are private (I have direct access only to mine, you 
only to yours)~ This means that only I can know with certainty 
whether I am in pain,, and I can only surmise that another is in pain 
(by inference from his behavior, the external phenomena which are 
directly observable by me, and which I infer to be the outward mani-
festations of pain in him)., 
Now this conclusion of the traditional view (that our language 
of sensations is private) has been rejected by both the no-names and 
composite views; in the former case for the reason that it presupposes 
that words like 1 painv are labels for private objects - but that . ''·'1 ,'t., 
private objects cannot be labeled; and in the latter case for the rea= 
son that, as a matter of fact, words like Vpainv are part of our pub-
lic language and so must have communicable meanings., 
The particular adjustments Pitcher and Donagan have made in their 
respective viewsi, in order to avoid the unacceptable conclusion of the 
traditional view, need not be reviewed again heree What we shall see 
is that, in accepting the proposition usensations are private"s, both 
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have accepted a thesis which differs only insignificantly from the 
traditional conclusion, .and which is just as unacceptable. 'I;'he tr~-
ditional conclusion may be stated thus: I have a sort of knowledge 
in my own case that no one else may have and that I may not have in 
the case of anyone else, namely the .knowledge of whether I am at any 
particular time experiencing any particular sensation, whether I am, 
for example, in pain. A review of Pitcher's and Donagan 1 s expressions 
of the conviction that sensations are private will show that they, in 
effect, express a similarly unacceptable thesis. 
Pitcher said~ 
Everyone acknowledges that sensations are pri-
vate, that no one can experience another per-
son's sensations, so that the spec.ial felt 
quality of each person's sensations is known 
to him alone ••• Thus, when you are in pain, I 
do not know, cannot know,. the .character of 
your sensation - whether, for example it is 
exactly like what I might feel [in the same 
circumstances] or whefger it is something 
altogether different. · 
Thus, Pitcher's claim is that one does have a kind of knowledge only 
in his own case, although it is not, as the traditionalist would have 
it, that he is in pain; it is that he knows "the special felt quality" 
of his own pain - something he·cannot know in the case of another. 
Presumably, "knowing the special felt quality of one's pain" means 
"knowing what one's pain feels likei1 , and what it is that I cannot 
know of another is what his pain feels likeo 
. ._...,,.,.·-· 
Donagan expresses a similar view of the:matter~ 
the crux is that provided what a man truthfully 
reports as pain is always what he would 
naturally express by pain-behavior, it matters 
not at all what it is that he truthfully reports 
as pain. 17 
Now what a tn'an truthfully reports .as pain is pain, of course, so 
when ·E>onagan says here "it matters not at all what it is", what sort 
of possible difference is he implying? Here is his answer: 
whether the.internal character of what is 
expt;"es.s.ed in these ways [by pain-behavior 
for example] is the same for you as for 
me is irrelevant to t.he meaning of the 
word [to that of the word 'pain', for 
example]. 18 
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Each of us, then, does have knowledge in his own case which he doesn't 
have in the case of others - knowledge of the."internal character" of 
h . . 19 1.S own pal.no. By the "inter.nal character" of one's sensations, I 
take it,· Donagan means something like· what Pitcher meant by their 
"special felt quality", namely, what one's sensations feel like. For 
both Pitcher and Donagan the~, :!!sensations are private",· comes to 
something like 11 1 cannot know what another's sensations feel like"• 
This proposition seems to be asserted by both Pitcher and Donagan as 
a sort of necessary truth, as we shall see. 
Pitcher, as seen in the quotation above, states that it is not 
just that I do not, but·::that J; cannot know the character of your sen-
sations. This indicates that what Pitcher sees as being involved here 
is some sort of logical impossibility .. Donagan's remark that "the 
proposition, 'Sensations are private', is absurd if it is advanced as 
equivalent to: 'Sensations happen to be private; it is not the case 
that they are public 11120 (along with other of his remarks about the 
privacy of sensations, which we have already seen), indicates that he 
too sees the matter as involving a sort of logical impossibility (that 
·sensations are private does not happen to be the case, it ~ be the 
case, i.e., it is not a contingent, but a necessary truth).· 
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What we have.then is the following~ Sensations are private i"Q the 
sense that only I .can know what .my s.ensations feel like (e.g., wh1:1,t pain 
feels like to me) •. This is a necessary truth, be.cause its 9pposite, 
my knowing what s·omeone else's sensations feel like is a logical 
impossibility. The latter is logically ·impossible because the only 
way for me to know what another's sens.ations feel like is to have them, 
but i.t is logically impossible that one person experience another's 
sensations~ or in other words, that two people have the same sensationo 
When the matter is stated this way, .and it seems clear .that this is 
what Pitcher I s and Donagan I s assertions that sensations are private 
come to, it is more easily seen that, far from assenting to this 
assertion, as Pitcher and Donagan say, this is the very same position 
(with only a minor terminological alteration) that Wittgenstein 
attacked as in one sense false and in another nonsense: 
In what sense are my sensations private? 
Well, only I can know whether I am really 
in pain; another can only surmise it. 
- In.one way this is wrong, and in another 
nonsense. If we are using the word 'to 
know' as it is normally used (and how else 
are we to use it?), then other people very 
often know when I .am in pain. - Yes, but 
all the same not with the certainty with 
which I know it myself l - .It can I t be !:laid 
of ·.me·:a.t··.atf-·lexci:fpt: perh1:1ps .. as a: joke) that 
I :kµpw ,I am ·in ·pa:in.:: ·W:hat is .. it: supposed to 
.mean t~,e·xcept perhaps that I am in pain?2L 
Now one can see that the no-names and composite expressions of the pro-
position "sensations are private" differ from the position being 
attacked in the above passage from the Investigations only in that 
they have. substituted··the. contention "only I can know what my sensa-
tions (e.g., pain) feel like" for "only I can know whether I am really 
in pain''. This version of the privacy of sensation fares no better 
than the traditional version, for Wittgenstein's conunents above 
apply equally to it. 
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If we are using I to know' as it .no.rmally is used, then other 
people very often know what my sensations feel like. Innumerable cases 
like the following can be readily brought to mind. I have just lost 
a loved one, say, and someone else who has recently suffered a similar 
bereavement says, 11 1 know just what it feels like to you - having lost 
her this way, for the same thing .happened to me". And this case can 
be imag.ined as one in which the knowledge that someo.ne else. knows how 
he feels is a comfort to the sufferero The example is of an emotion 
rather thqn a sensation, chosen for its familiarity, but the case may 
be altered to one of, say, having hit a thumb with a hammer, if that 
seems to inake the point clearer: 11 ! know how that feels to you..;.. hav-
ing hit your thumb with the hammer I did the same thing last _week". 
So if we are using 1 to know' as it is ordinarily used, then others 
very often know what my sensations feel likeo This points out that 
having another's sensations is not the criterion in our ordinary 
language game for knowing what another's sensations are like, and thus, 
that 11 it is logically impossible for one person to have another's 
sensations" does not entail "only I can know what my sensations feel 
1 ike". 
And it can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that 
I know what my sensations feel like: 11 1 know what my sensations feel 
like; my pain hurts (my tickle tickles, etc.) - What do yours feel 
like?". That should strike one as curious if not humorous, for what is 
11 I know what my sensations feel like" supposed to mean, except perhaps 
that I have sensations. There is the possible objection here that 11 
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thing, that sentence may be used .to distinguish men from animals. 
Animals have sensations, but we might not want to say that they know 
what their sens.ations feel like, as we might of humans. But here 
111 know what my sensations feel like" just means that 1, like all 
human beings, have self-consciousness or, in other words, is just equiv-
.alent to "1 artr'a :human beiJ.lgu. But that, of course, is not something 
that only 1 may know. Although there may be a use for the proposition 
"I know what my sensations feel like" (the use above, for example), 
it is not the expression of a kind of private knowledge. 
The following remark from Wittgenstein is directed at just this 
i proble}n: 11 1 know how the color green looks to ~ - surely. that makes 
sensel - Certainly.. What use of the proposition are you thinking of?11 ~ 2 
One might easily substitute in this passage 111 know how pain feels to 
me". One may imagine a use for almost any sentence. 111 know how the 
color green looks to me" might b~ used in a dispute over what color 
to paint a room. One person says, "Let's paint the room gre.en. 11 The 
other says, "Let's not; 1 don't like green." The first person replies, 
"But I think green is a beautiful color!" and the second person says 
111 know how the color green looks to me - it looks awful!". One could 
probably also imagine a context in which there would be a use for "1 
know how pain feels to me" (perhaps a masochist might follow this 
assertion with 11 ••• it feels good. 11 ). But it will not qe used to express 
something which only I can know. Thus, Wittgenstein's remarks attack-
ing the traditional notion of the privacy of sensations apply equally 
to the slightly modified versions of Pitcher and Donagana "Sensations 
are private" again turns·ciut to be in one way false, in another 
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nonsense. 
Another, rather different, sour.ce of the tendency to assert 
'sensations are private' is that produced by the idea that this propo".'. 
sition expresses a necessary truth, since .. ·two people's having the same 
sensation seems to be a logical impossibility. As we have seen, this 
seems to be at least a partial motive in the cases· of· both Pitcher a.nd 
Donagan. But it should be clear from our.earlier discussion of ·that;,, if 
1 to know' is being used notmljllly,,.,· h.aviµg .anotll.e:r 's ·S~nsations, is not the 
criterion for saying that one knows what another's sensation (e.g., 
pain) or his emotion (e.g., grief) feels like. If:tnis is understood, 
then the idea that it is logically impossible that two people have the 
same sensation should not tempt one to say that the proposition 
'sensations are private' expresses a necessary truth .. As we shall 
see, however, this notion of "logical impossibility" is itself unclear 
(at least in the present case). 23 
There seem to be two important interpretations of the notion of 
logical impossibility. One is that the claim that 'p' asserts a logi-
cal impossibility is equivalent to the assertion that 'p' is senseless .. 
In the case before us, this version of logical impossibility asserts, 
e .. g., that 11 1 felt his pain" is senselesso The other interpretation 
is that to say 'p' is logically impossible is to say the negation of 
'p' is a necessary truth. Thus the claim that it is logically 
impossible that one experience another's sensations is, on this view, 
equivalent to the assertion that t:I did not feel his pain' (or 'A1U 
pains I feel are my own') is a necessary truth. One difficulty here 
is in specifying precisely what is said to be senseless or a necessary 
truth. 
There is one s.ense in which I may be said to have .another, I? pain: 
-we ·s·omet-imes say things like "I've got the very same backache yqu had 
last we·ek" or "l've got your headache''• It may seem, however, t:;hat 
such uses are only metaphor.ical, · that two people can't Literally have 
the same pain. But now what is being denied? What is this other, 
literal, sense of "having another's pain"? 
. 24 
The reply may be something like the following: We sometimes 
say two people have the same car when they own identical models. But 
then there is another sense in which two people may be said to have 
the same car, and that is when they own a single car jointly. Now_it 
is in the former sense of "having the same one11 .that two people may be 
said to have the same pain, as when we say things like ''We have the 
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same backache". But it ··.is in the second sense of 'having the same one' 
(that given by the example of joint car owners) that it is logically 
impossible that two people have the same sensation. 
But here, although one may say that the sense of 'the same' in 
"two people having the same sensation" which is logically impossible., 
is that of 'the same' in the case of joint car ownershiP,and be under 
the impression that he has speci,fied a literal sense of 11 two people 
having the same sensation", still no literal sense has been specified. 
The attempt was to say that what 'having the same one' means in the 
second sense above of 'two people have the same car', is:what 'having 
the same_ one' means in the literal sense of 'two people having the same 
sensation'. But, as Cook puts it, 
~hat could it mean to speak of transferring 
a word or expression and its meaning from a 
context in which it has a particular use to 
a sentence in which it has no use (except 
as a part of speech)-., and certainly not the 
use it had in the context from which it was 
allegedly transferred? 25 
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Now, as to the ·two versions of logioal···impossibility, those who opt for 
the first version "find themselves in the odd position of sayil}g that it 
is the literal sense of a sentence which is senseless1126 and with t;he 
adoption of either version, one is faced with specifying the alleged 
literal sense of a proposition which is supposed to express a logical 
impossibility. But that, as we have seen, is just what cannot be done. 
It appears then, that the proposition 'sensations are private' fares 
no better as a necessary truth than it did as the expression of a 
peculiar kind of knowledge each person has only in his own_ca~e~ 
'Sensations are private I must be given up as confused.• The prem:!,ss 
connnon to all three of the·.views which we have seen is a confusion 
connnon to them all. 
Wittgenstein's Position 
This last point, that the proposition 'sensations are private' is 
itself nonsense (or else false), is the most important point of 
Wittgenstein's elucidation of the private language problem, and it is 
the missing of this point which led to the failure of the no-names 
and composite attempts at solving the puzzles generated by the tradi-
tional view. It was the notion that sensations are private which was 
the basis for Pitcher's view that sensation words are not really 
names of sensations, and it was the same notion which required Donagan 
to say, in effect, that everyone's pain might be diffe.rent, but that so 
lon~f:as it· was the accompaniment ,o-f the same behavior, it was correctly 
called 'pain'. These puzzles do not arise once 'sensations are private' 
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is given·up. 
It is important at this point to remember that Witt;genst;ein, and, 
of course, Pitcher and E>onagan indirectly, have been trying to clear 
up some puzzles generated by particular ways of looking at the matter 
of our language of sensations.. The most:'.important part of such a 
project is the identification (or "diagnosis") of any misunderstandings 
involved in the views in .question. If misunderstandings can be iden-
tified which are responsible for the puzzles generated, then that inay · 
be all that it is necessary - one may be in a position to see that 
there is no longer anything ~~zzling in the: matter at hand. 
As Wittgenstein puts it: 
Philosophy simply puts everything before us, 
and neither·ex;plains nor deduces anything. 
- Since everything:.lies open to view there 
is nothing to explain.27 
This is the sort of solution Wittgenstein has offered to the 
private language problem. He has identified misunderstandings about 
how language functions (e.g., the mistakes of thinking that all words 
are names, that name& always function on the model of labels, that 
'sensations are private' makes sense) which are the sources of the 
puzzles we have seen. It is a mistaKe to think that Wittgenstein 
28 
offers a general theory of sensation, or of anything else; what he 
offers is .a description of the language-games we play. With this in 
mind, we may proceed to a brief look at Wittgenstein's view of our 
actual use of sensation words, the sort of thing that ''lies open before 
us" o As we have seen, one of the recurrent:. puzzles in the problem of 
sensation and private language was the idea that one has a special 
kind of knowledge in his own case that he carinot have in the case of 
others• Wittgenstein explains the asymmetry between first and· third 
.... -,. - .... r. -
person sensation statements which is the source of this puzzle, as 
follows. 
In the cases of third person sensation statements, the first 
important thing to notice is that there are cases in which one is 
certain of another's pain ("I can be as certain of someone else's 
. 29 
sensations as of any fact ••• ,, ), as well as doubtful cases and cases 
in which one may be certain another is only pretending. Cases of the 
first sort are paradigms for the use of phrases like 'he is in pain'. 
It is from such cases that one learns the use of such expressions. 
To use a previous example, a child screaming in pain from having 
boiling water spilled on him is a paradigm case of someone being in 
pain - the concept of doubt has no place in this context, but can 
only be injected as a manifestation of philosophical confusion over 
the use of these words (e.g., as a result of thinking that having 
another's pain is the criterion for knowing another is in pain). 
Cases of the second sort allow the possibility of one's being 
mistaken about another's being in pain ("he was only pretending after 
all") or about who was in pain ( 11 I'thoughtyou had the toothache, but 
I see now it was that fellow moaning over there in the corner"). And 
then, of course, there are also cases of the third sort, such as the 
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pretend-pain of a dramatic performance. Although it is quite possible 
that I be mistaken about another's pain, (he may be in pain but con-
ceal it, or fool me by pretending to be in pain when he is not), there 
is nothing essentially private (private in the "philosophical" .sense) 
in any of these cases. The other person, as we have seen, has no 
knowledge that I could not have. 
In the cases of first person sensation statements, on the other 
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hand, it is important to remember that there is not the possiqility 
of mistake as in third-person utterances. It makes no sense to speak 
of one's being mistaken about whether he, himself, is in pain (although 
he may lie of course), and so, as discussed earlier, neither does it 
make sense to think of one's having special knowledge in his own case. 
This does not seem puzzling, once one has gotten rid of the idea 
that sensations are private objects, an idea which resulted from con-
struing sensation words on analogy with words for physical objects, and 
which thus gave rise to the idea of private ostensive definitions by 
which one would associate names with these private objects. Wittgen-
stein suggested the following alternative account of how one learns 
first person sensation statements. 
How do words refer to sensations? - There 
doesn't seem to .be any problem here; don't 
we talk about sensations everyday, and give 
themnames? But how is the connexion between 
the name and the thing named set up? This 
question is the same as: how does a human 
being learn the meaning of the names of sen-
sations? - of the word 'pain' for example. 
Here is one ·possibility: words are connected 
with the primitive, the natural, expressions 
of the sensations and used in their place. 
A child- has hurt himself and he cries; and 
then adults talk to him and teach him exclam-
ations and, later, sentenceso They teach 
the child new pain-behavior.30 
This is the sort of way in which first person uses of sensation words 
are names of sensations. Someone learns exclamations (such as 'ouch'!) 
to replace natural pain behavior (such as crying and screaming) or 
sentences (such as '· I have a toothache') to replace, or to go alone 
with, moaning and holding one's jawo One can imagine, as Wittgenstein 
suggests, "not merely the words 'I am in pain', but also the answer 
31 
'It's not so bad' replaced by instinctive noises and gestures." 
The important point here, again, is that once one comes to see 
that what generate._s the puzzles of the traditional, no-names and com-
posite views are misui:i,derstandings and false analogies, the puzzles 
dissolve and what is left is merely the description of our language 
games - what is open to everyone's view who is unhindered by such 
misunderstandings. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
As outlined in the Chapter I, the objectives of this thesis were 
multiple. After an initial characterization of the traditional view 
that areas of our cormnon language are private, two examples of possible 
alternative views which have been entertained as solutions to the 
puzzles of the traditional view were examined. These were Pitcher's 
view that a private language is impossible, and Donagan's view that 
although our cormnon language is indeed public, a private language is 
not impossible. 
We have seen as elements of these three views, three theories of 
names and naming: (1) the traditional view that names·function as 
labels for objects and that names ('such as 'pain') are assigned to 
sensations by each individual, privately, since sensations are private 
objects, (2) the no-names view that names are indeed like labels for 
objects, but that words like 'pain' are therefore not names, since 
sensations are private objects, and private objects cannot be named, 
and (3) the composite view that names are assigned to private sensa-
tions indirectly, through reference to their outward manifestations 
and the circumstances of their occurrence. All of these views were 
rejected as involving unacceptable consequences. 
Views (2) and (3) above were also rejected as interpretations of 
Wittgenstein's view ;i.n the Philosophical Investigations, primarily 
because they involve the mistake of taking Wittgenstein to have 
accepted as true the proposition that sensations are private, when in 
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fact he correctly rejected that proposition as nonsense (or else false). 
It was thus shown that Wittgenstein's position was in fact that a pri-
vate langwige is impossible (or better, that the notion of the possibil-
ity of a private language rested on a confusion), but that his view of 
the matter was quite different from that depicted by either Pitcher or 
Donagan. And:hence, we have seen that the correct view of names and 
naming (as well as the correct interpretation of Wittgenstein's work on 
this problem) was that there are different kinds of names (not just 
names on the model of labels) and that there is neither point in saying 
that sensation words are not names (contrary to Pitcher's view) nor , '. 
sense in saying that sensation words are names of private objects (con-
trary to Donagan's view). 
In conclusion, a final analysis of the private language problem 
1 
and Wittgenstein's solution to it is here offered. The basic 
questions of the problem are (1) whether I use a private language when 
I talk about my sensations and feeling$, and (2) whether it might be 
possible to invent one, should it be that I do not already have one. 
Wittgenstein has shown that question (1) either has an obvious 
answer, or is senseless. If it merely means, "Do I understand others 
and they me?", the answer is obvious, and affirmative, and I do not use 
a private language when I speak of my sensations and feelings. There 
may be a tendency to ask "But do others really mean the same by their 
sensation words as I do? 11 • However, the only criterion of one's under-
standing the meaning of a word is his making correct~ of it, and so 
the question, "Do others understand me when I~ sensation words?" 
(and vice-versa), is senseless. 
There are several possible approaches to answering question (2). 
83 
A conclusive demonstration, of course, would be to produce a private 
language, but this solution is not possible, since the claim to have 
invented a private language is uncheckable. But if one were to say that 
question (2) is unanswerable in principle, the charge seems justified 
that the question is therefore senseless. 
A feasible approach to defending the possibility of an invented 
private language would be by showing that the definition of a private 
language does not contain a contradiction~ that (1) one might invent 
a vocabulary and rules for its use, (2) associate terms with his own 
numerically and qual:ttatively distinct (private) experiences, and 
(3) check questions about correct use of these terms by consulting his 
memory .. 
Thus, it would have to be shown that there is a subject matter for 
the private language, that talk of directly associating names with log-
ically private data makes sense, and that questions about the correct 
application of these names make sense and could be settled by appeals 
to memory. Showing that a private language is impossible will involve 
showing that the foregoing conditions cannot be meto This is what 
Wittgenstein may be seen as having doneo 
He has shown that the required notion of private ostensive defini-
tion is defective, and .that talk ·of· cot~c~-~e of words in .i private 
language does not make sense. Above all, he has shown that there is no 
subject matter for a private language, for claims of the privacy of 
sensations or of a realm of private data or knowledge turn out to be 
sense le.s s. 
FOOTNOTES 
1r am indebted to Professor G. G. Clements for this way of 
looking at the matter. 
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AN HISTORICAL REPRESENTATIVE OF 
THE TRADITIONAL VIEW 
The two primary reasons for attaching this note are, first, as 
mentioned in Chapter I, it seems that the full significance of the pri-
vate language problem can only be realized when its connection with 
the history of philosophy is recognized, and second, it seems that an 
example is called for in partial justification for referring to the 
view characterized in Chapter II as the "traditional" view. For these 
purposes parts of the works of Thomas Hobbes will be examined here, in 
order to show that his views entail the view that we use private 
languages in speaking of our sensations and feelings. The choice to 
use Hobbes as such an example was made because it. seems that an 
example "diagnosis" can be produced rather briefly in his case. 
Hobbes' logic includes a section on names which begins with a 
discussion of marks and signs. '·Mark~ he defines as "sensible things 
taken at pleasure, that, by the sense of them, such thoughts may be 
recalled to our mind as are like those thoughts for which we took 
1 
them." Marks are devised by an individual as an aid to his own mem-
ory. Signs, on the other hand, (aside from "natural signs", such as 
a thick cloud being a sign of rain) are devised so that "what one man 
finds out may be manifested and made known to others11 • 2 And names 
perform the .function of both marks and signs, "but they serve for 
marks before they be used as signs 11 • 3 That is, "though a man were 
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alone in the world they would be useful to him in helping him to 
4· 
remember" but, there being no other people, would not in this case 
serve as signs. Names may serve as signs to others only when 
·-e:omhined .in sentences: 
Words so connected as :that they become 
signs of our thoughts, are .called 
SPEECH, of which every part is a name 
•.•• they cannot be signs otherwise thart 5 
by being disposed and ordered in speech. 
Hobbes sums :up this part of his theory of -name·s and naming as follows: 
[T]he nature of a name consists principally 
in this, that it is a mark taken for mem-
ory's sake; but- it serves also by accident 
to signify and make-known to others what 
we remember ourselves, and, there(ore, I 
will define it thus:"" .,.,.A .llfil!Jg is a word 
taken at pleasure to serve_ for a mark, 
which may raise in our mind a thought like 
to s·ome thought we had before, and which 
being pronounced to others, may be to them 
a sign of what thought the s.peaker had, or 
had not before in his mind.6 
As indicated in one of the passages above, Hobbes sees all words 
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as names. He emphasizes this point by pointing out that, though 'man', 
'tree', and 'stone' are obviously names, so also are 'future', 'noth-
ing', and 'impossible', and in general, "seeing every name has some 
relation to that which is named ••• it is lawful for doctrine's sake to 
7 
apply the word ':thing' to whatsoever we name". Thus, Hobbes' view 
of the matter is that all words are names and that different sorts of 
111:,hingsll have names: nothing and the ftJture have names, as well as 
men, trees, and stoneso 
However, as we have seen, for Hobbes 
names are signs not of things, but of our 
cognitions ••• for that the sound ¢f this 
word 'stone' should l;>e the sign of a stone, 
cannot be understood in any sense but this, 
that he that hears it collects that hg 
that pronounces it thinks of~ stone. 
Now, however one interprets Hobbes' statement that names are signs of 
cognitions, and his use of the word "cognitions", Hobbes' views of 
names and naming will lead to the view either that all of our words 
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have private meanings, or that, at least, our words for sensations and 
emotions do. 
This can be made clear by applying Hobbes' theory of language 
to the area of our words for sensations (he does not himself discuss 
this area when fo:nnulating':the principles we have seen). First, since 
all words are names, according to Hobbes, words like 'pain' must be. 
And if the word 'pain' is first a mark, a help to one's own memory 
which only "accidentally" serves as a sign to others of what concep-
tions are in the mind of the speaker, then one must employ the sort 
of private ostensive definition discussed as part of the traditional 
view of Chapter II. One must undertake to associate the mark 'pain' 
with the sensation, the "thing" which th:(.s .:mark signifies, privately. 
Only later, when this mark is used in speech, will it serve as a sign 
to others of what is in one's own consciousness (i.e., of what 
"cognition" one is having). But here, as Wittgenstein pointed out, 
one will have no criterion of having remembered correctly what= 
sensation this mark is to be a sign of. 
This view will also generate the analogical argument puzzle, for 
others will have no way of knowing what cognition the sign 'pain' is 
a sign of, except in his own case. So communication with the word 
'pain' will have to be explained in terms of each persons' assuming 
that others indicate the same cognition by the word 'pain as he does, 
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on the basis of the other's similar behavior and constitution. But 
here, since the meaning of the word 'pain' is the cognition or concep-
tion it names ("the truth of a proposition is never evident, until we 
conceive the.meaning of the words or terms whereof it consisteth, which 
are always conceptions of the mind"?) no one may be certain that 
another means the same by the word 'pain' as he does. 
Thus Hobbes' general view of language (that it consists of names, 
the meanings of which are the things they refer to) entails the exist-
ence of a private language, at least in the areas of our talk of sen-
sations. 
Hobbes' view might even be taken as entailing the view that all 
of our language is actually private, that is, that each of us is cer-
tain only of what he means by the words he uses, since Hobbes views all 
words as. naming the conceptions of the speaker. This interpretation 
would be less generous to Hobbes, however, and would require a more 
lengthy discussion. At any rate, Hobbes' view entails the view that 
at least our language of sensations is private, and that is suf~icient 
for the purpose of this appendix. 
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